Feeling Utilitarian

Utilitas ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Sneddon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Normative Agents ◽  
Peter Railton ◽  
Michael Stocker

Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams are recent proponents of the influential objection against utilitarianism that it leads to important forms of alienation. The famous response is that such objections are mistaken. The objections picture agents being motivated by the principle of utility, but, e.g., Peter Railton argues we should see this principle as purely normative – agents can be motivated any way they like and still be ‘objective’ consequentialists. I argue that this type of position is inadequate as a full answer to Stocker and Williams. I trace this failure to his inattention to moral psychology, then show how other remarks made by Mill provide the roots of a better answer to Stocker and Williams.

Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Utilitarismus

1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Personal Projects ◽  
Peter Railton ◽  
Order Reflection

AbstractThis paper explores the question whether utilitarianism is compatible with the autonomy of the moral agent. The paper begins by considering Bernard Williams' famous complaint that utilitarianism cannot do justice to the personal projects and commitments constitutive of character. Recent work (by Peter Railton among others) has established that a utilitarian agent need not be free of such personal projects and commitments, and could even affirm them morally at the level of second"order reflection. But a different and more subtle problem confronts this approach: the use of utilitarian principles to justify the cultivation of personal projects and attachments undermines the autonomy to support this objection, according to which autonomy is a matter of acting in a way one can reflectively endorse.

Utilitarianism and Psychological Realism

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-367
Author(s):  
SOPHIE RIETTI
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Psychological Realism ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Main Challenge ◽  
Michael Stocker

Utilitarianism has frequently been criticized for lacking psychological realism, but what this means and why it is thought to matter varies. This article distinguishes and examines three main relevant kinds of appeals to psychological realism: (a) A minimalist, self-avowedly metaethically neutral and empirically based ‘ought implies can’ approach, exemplified by Owen Flanagan. (b) Arguments from psychological costs and flourishing, exemplified by Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams. (c) ‘Thick’ psychological realism, exemplified by Elizabeth Anscombe, where a conception of human nature does not simply provide constraints on value theory, but forms the substantive basis on which it builds. The main challenge raised for utilitarianism turns out to be metaethical, not a matter of empirical psychology. The question is not so much whether utilitarianism can accommodate (putative) descriptive facts of human psychology as such, but what normative weight these facts should be given and why.

Moral Schizophrenia and the Paradox of Friendship

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT WOODCOCK
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Psychological Phenomenon ◽  
Psychological Challenge ◽  
Rule Out ◽  
Ethical Obligations ◽  
Michael Stocker

In his landmark paper, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, Michael Stocker introduces an affliction that is, according to his diagnosis, endemic to all modern ethical theories. Stocker's paper is well known and often cited, yet moral schizophrenia remains a surprisingly obscure diagnosis. I argue that moral schizophrenia, properly understood, is not necessarily as disruptive as its name suggests. However, I also argue that Stocker's inability to demonstrate that moral schizophrenia constitutes a reductio of modern ethical theories does not rule out the possibility that he has identified a noteworthy psychological phenomenon. Stocker is, in my opinion, correct to note that balancing our broad ethical obligations with authentic personal motives is a non-trivial psychological challenge, even if this challenge is not equivalent to a mental disorder. Hence, I conclude that proponents of modern ethical theorists should not be complacent about the burdens associated with implementing a ‘schizophrenic’ moral psychology.

Cooperation and obligation in early parent-child relationships

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross A. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Close Relationships ◽  
Social Agency ◽  
Infant Survival ◽  
Peer Experiences ◽  
Early Experiences ◽  
Early Parent ◽  
Collaborative Skills ◽  
Parent Child Relationships

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.

Bernard Williams

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P. Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Bernard Williams

Socratic Moral Psychology

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Brickhouse ◽  
Nicholas D. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology

Identity, voice, and the psycho/dialogical perspectives from moral psychology.

1995 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Day ◽  
Mark B. Tappan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology

Is the Buddhist Doctrine of Non-Self Conceptually Coherent?

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Buddhist Doctrine

Virtually all schools of Buddhism do not accept a permanent, substantial self, and see everything as non-self (anatta). In the first part of this article I recall some arguments traditionally given in support of this perspective. Descartes’ cogito argument contradicts this, by suggesting that we know infallibly that the self, understood as a substantial enduring entity, does exist. The German aphorist Lichtenberg has suggested that all Descartes could claim to have established was the impersonal ‘There is thinking’ (Es denkt), which would support the perspective of non-self. Bernard Williams has argued that Lichtenberg’s impersonal version of the cogito is conceptually incoherent, which would entail that the Buddhist perspective of non-self is also incoherent. I propose to defend the coherence of the Buddhist perspective of non-self against Williams’s argument.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document