VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE LOGICAL SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer

In his recent book “Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy”, John Keown puts forward two slippery slope arguments against the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. One of these arguments claims that a defender of voluntary euthanasia is logically committed to the permissibility of non-voluntary euthanasia. This paper seeks to show that Keown’s argument either rests on a logical confusion or on a misunderstanding of the value of autonomy.

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS DOUGLAS

One prevalent type of slippery slope argument has the following form: (1) by doing some initial act now, we will bring it about that we subsequently do some more extreme version of this act, and (2) we should not bring it about that we do this further act, therefore (3) we should not do the initial act. Such arguments are frequently regarded as mistaken, often on the grounds that they rely on speculative or insufficiently strong empirical premises. In this article I point out another location at which these arguments may go wrong: I argue that, in their standard form, the truth of their empirical premises constitutes evidence for the falsity of their normative premises. If we will, as predicted, do the further act in the future, this gives us at least a prima facie reason to believe that the performance of this further act would be good, and thus something we should try to bring about. I end by briefly assessing the dialectic implications of my argument. I delineate a subset of slippery slope arguments against which my objection may be decisive, consider how the proponents of such arguments may evade my objection by adding further premises, and examine the likely plausibility of these additional premises.


2002 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bagaric

AbstractA survey published in the Medical Journal of Australia in 1997 showed that the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia in Australia was higher than in the Netherlands. Euthanasia is illegal in Australia, while it is openly practiced in the Netherlands. It has been suggested that the results of the survey undermine the slippery slope argument against legalising euthanasia. This is wrong. Although at the time of the survey, euthanasia was formally prohibited by the law in Australia, the medical and legal culture was such that doctors could practice euthanasia with impunity — in certain circumstances euthanasia by doctors was effectively condoned. This is in fact supported by the findings of the survey. The survey suggests that there were approximately 6,700 cases of euthanasia in Australia in the year from July 1994 to June 1995 — not one of which was prosecuted, let alone resulted in a conviction. Ultimately the survey merely shows that in a climate where voluntary euthanasia is tolerated, wide scale abuses (in the form of non-voluntary euthanasia) occur. Paradoxically the results of the survey give further support to the slippery slope argument.


1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 580-585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher James Ryan

Objective: The aim of the paper is to determine the role that psychiatrists should play in legislation that establishes a right to active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). Method: One version of the “slippery slope” argument, usually invoked against the legalisation of AVE, is recast as an argument for the introduction of strong safeguards in any future AVE legislation. The literature surrounding the prevalence of psychiatric illnesses in the terminally ill, physicians' ability to identify such illnesses and the aetiology of suicide in the terminally ill is examined. Results: The strength of the slippery slope argument, combined with the poor ability of general physicians to diagnose psychiatric illness in the terminally ill, demands that any legislation allowing AVE should require a mandatory psychiatric review of the patient requesting euthanasia. Conclusions: Any legislation adopted that establishes a right to active voluntary euthanasia should include a mandatory psychiatric review of the person requesting euthanasia and a cooling off period before the request is acceded to. In addition, the discovery of a serious mental illness ought to disqualify the affected person from the right to AVE until that illness resolves.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Penney Lewis

Slippery slope arguments appear regularly whenever morally contested social change is proposed. Such arguments assume that all or some consequences which could possibly flow from permitting a particular practice are morally unacceptable.Typically, “slippery slope” arguments claim that endorsing some premise, doing some action or adopting some policy will lead to some definite outcome that is generally judged to be wrong or bad. The “slope” is “slippery” because there are claimed to be no plausible halting points between the initial commitment to a premise, action, or policy and the resultant bad outcome. The desire to avoid such projected future consequences provides adequate reasons for not taking the first step.Thus the legalization of abortion in limited circumstances is asserted to lead down the slippery slope towards abortion on demand and even infanticide; and the legalization of assisted suicide to lead inexorably to the acceptance of voluntary euthanasia and subsequently to the sanctioning of the practice of nonvoluntary euthanasia – even involuntary euthanasia of “undesirable” individuals.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Walton

Although studies have yielded a detailed taxonomy of types of slippery slope arguments, they have failed to identify a basic argumentation scheme that applies to all. Therefore, there is no way of telling whether a given argument is a slippery slope argument or not. This paper solves the problem by providing a basic argumentation scheme. The scheme is shown to fit a clear and easily comprehensible example of a slippery slope argument that strongly appears to be reasonable, something that has also been lacking.


1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trudy Govier

Slippery slope arguments are commonly thought to be fallacious. But is there a single fallacy which they all commit? A study of applied logic texts reveals competing diagnoses of the supposed error, and several recent authors take slippery slope arguments seriously. Clearly, there is room for comment. I shall give evidence of divergence on the question of what sort of argument constitutes a slippery slope, distinguish four different types of argument which have all been deemed to be slippery slopes, and contend that two of these types need involve no logical error.We find in textbook accounts three quite differently oriented treatments of slippery slope: conceptual — relating to vagueness and the ancient sorites paradox; precedential — relating to the need to treat similar cases consistently; and causal — relating to the avoidance of actions which will, or would be likely to, set off a series of undersirable events.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document