Environmental regulation, benefit-cost analysis and the policy environment in less developed countries

1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROB DAVIES

The general argument presented by Arrow et al. runs as follows: government regulation might improve on free market outcomes, since markets sometimes misallocate resources. However, the costs of regulations need to be assessed against their presumed benefits. Benefit-cost analysis is a valuable technique for making such an assessment, even though it was developed for the appraisal of physical investment projects. However, since the technique is not perfect, it should not provide the only input into the process, but rather be part of an array of evidence.

1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter A Diamond ◽  
Jerry A Hausman

Without market outcomes for comparison, internal consistency tests, particularly adding-up tests, are needed for credibility. When tested, contingent valuation has failed. Proponents find surveys tested poorly done. To the authors’ knowledge, no survey has passed these tests. The ‘embedding effect’ is the similarity of willingness-to-pay responses that theory suggests (and sometimes requires) be different. This problem has long been recognized but not solved. The authors conclude that current methods are not suitable for damage assessment or benefit-cost analysis. They believe the problems come from an absence of preferences, not a flaw in survey methodology, making improvement unlikely.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Daniel Acland

Abstract Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay (WTP). This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare the high cost of including non-sovereignty-warranting impacts to the relatively low cost of excluding sovereignty-warranting impacts.


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