Alfred Jules Ayer

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 259-259

Alfred Jules Ayer (1910– ) was born in London and educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He attended sessions of the logical positivist ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1932, and taught at Oxford from 1933 until joining the Army in 1940. His Language, Truth and Logic was published in 1936, and The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge in 1940. After war service he returned to Oxford in 1945, and became Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, London, the following year. The Problem of Knowledge was published in 1956. In 1959 he returned to Oxord as Wykeham Professor of Logic, a post he held until his retirement in 1977. He had been made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1952, and was knighted in 1970. Among his publications after he returned to Oxford are The Concept of a Person (1963), Philosophical Essays (1965), The Origins of Pragmatism (1968), Metaphysics and Common Sense (1969), Russell and Moore: the Analytical Heritage (1971), Probability and Evidence (1972), The Central Questions of Philosophy (1973), and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1982).

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 259-259
Author(s):  
Oswald Hanfling

Alfred Jules Ayer (1910– ) was born in London and educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He attended sessions of the logical positivist ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1932, and taught at Oxford from 1933 until joining the Army in 1940. His Language, Truth and Logic was published in 1936, and The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge in 1940. After war service he returned to Oxford in 1945, and became Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, London, the following year. The Problem of Knowledge was published in 1956. In 1959 he returned to Oxord as Wykeham Professor of Logic, a post he held until his retirement in 1977. He had been made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1952, and was knighted in 1970. Among his publications after he returned to Oxford are The Concept of a Person (1963), Philosophical Essays (1965), The Origins of Pragmatism (1968), Metaphysics and Common Sense (1969), Russell and Moore: the Analytical Heritage (1971), Probability and Evidence (1972), The Central Questions of Philosophy (1973), and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1982).


Author(s):  
Sharon Pillai

Mulk Raj Anand, together with Raja Rao and R. K. Narayan, made up a distinguished trio in the vanguard of twentieth-century Indian writing in English. His roles as essayist, short story writer, playwright, art critic, food critic, editor, activist, and social commentator over a near century-long life attest to his versatile genius and varied interests. Today, however, Anand is most famous for his talent as a novelist whose commitment to artistic verisimilitude and social justice compellingly redrew the ambit of literary representation in India to include marginalized subjectivities and subaltern realities. Mulk Raj Anand was born to a provincial Kshatriya Punjabi family in Peshawar. Anand’s formative years were spent in the cantonments of Nowshera and Mian Mir because his father, Lal Chand, was a subordinate functionary in the colonial army. During his years at Khalsa College in Amritsar, Anand became acquainted with the poet Mohammad Iqbal. He was also briefly involved in anti-colonial activities. Faced with familial strife and emotional tangles, Anand — with Iqbal’s encouragement — set sail to do his Ph.D. in England in 1925. He won a scholarship to University College, London, where he worked on a dissertation on British philosophy, and was awarded a doctorate in 1929.


Sir William Gowers, whose death occurred on May 4th, 1915, was a distinguished member of the medical profession, and in particular a neuropathologist of world-wide reputation. He was born in London on March 20, 1845, so that at the time of his death he had completed the allotted span of three score years and ten. He was educated at Christ Church School, Oxford, and received his medical education at University College, London, where he was a favourite pupil of Sir William Jenner, to whom in his early professional career he acted as private secretary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Peter Simons

Abstract Following its welcome revival in the late twentieth century, metaphysics in the analytic tradition has succumbed to decadence, with an astonishing variety of outlandish and extreme positions or “metaphysical follies” being taken seriously. This has caused an inevitable backlash among more scientifically-minded philosophers and incurred the scorn of scientists. Much of the reason for this is the blithe ignoring of empirical science by armchair metaphysicians. The roles of empirical knowledge in good, scientific metaphysics are however unclear. In virtue of its maximal generality, metaphysics is remote from straightforward empirical checks. This article explores, with historical and contemporary examples, the ways in which empirical information may inform and be fed back into metaphysics, the disputed role of common sense, and the delicate balance to be maintained, within a fallibilist, scientific metaphysics, between speculative, categorial and empirical elements.


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