A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

Negotiating Turkey's Membership to the European Union. Can the Member States Do As They Please?

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Hillion
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
European Union Enlargement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

Limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – Changing the fundamentals of the EU constitutional order through the conclusion of accession treaties – The case of Turkey – Caveats, precautions and fallback strategies in the ‘Negotiating Framework for Turkey’ – Enforcing the limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice before ratification and after entry into force.

scholarly journals Encuesta sobre el TJUE como actor de constitucionalidad

2017 ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Francisco Balaguer Callejón ◽  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert ◽  
Ascensión Elvira Perales ◽  
José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares ◽  
Javier Matía Portilla ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Law Professors

 En esta encuesta un grupo de Catedráticos de Derecho Constitucional contestan un conjunto de preguntas sobre el rol del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como actor de la constitucionalidad, especialmente en los casos en los que un Tribunal Constitucional nacional presenta una cuestión prejudicial ante el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, y las consecuencias que ello trae consigo en el orden constitucional tradicionalmente vinculado al Estado nacional soberano.In this academic survey a group of Constitutional Law Professors answer some questions about the role of the European Court of Justice as a constitutional actor, especially when a national constitutional court raises a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice of the European Union, and its consequences in the traditional constitutional order.

Fighting for Authority: Strategic Actions of National High Courts in the European Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Strategic Actions ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Lower Courts

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.

6. The preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

14. The European Union

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Constitutional Principle ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.

Genesis and Development of Legal Protection before Community Courts: A review of Eva Drewes, Entstehen und Entwicklung des Rechtsschutzes vor den Gerichten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2000.

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 741-745
Author(s):  
Timo Tohidipur
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Sectoral Approach ◽  
Community Courts

The emerging of an early idea, – the idea of a united Europe in peace replacing the destructive force of nationalism – could not have been a proper blueprint for the formation of a European Society until the brute force of the two World Wars prepared the ground for the awareness of political, economical, and social necessities. The first chapter in the book of the European Union regarding this founding idea was written back in 1951/52 by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a Community based upon law. At first, following Jean Monnet's sectoral approach toward integration in connection with the idea of supranationalism, unifying element should have been the supranational administrative body called “High Authority” (former name of the Commission in the first ESCS-Treaty). Given that the ECSC arose on the basis of law, one of the first and most important questions seemed to be the need of legal protection framing and balancing the power of the nearly almighty High Authority. This need should be satisfied by the establishment of a European Court of Justice (ECJ) as a permanent Court in the ECSC-Treaty. Although the shape of the former European Community has been immensely changed and extended through the years of integrational process, the once established ECJ still remains the judicial core in the institutional structure. But how did the system of legal protection react on the defiances of the integrational process?

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