14. The European Union

Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Hillion

Limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – Changing the fundamentals of the EU constitutional order through the conclusion of accession treaties – The case of Turkey – Caveats, precautions and fallback strategies in the ‘Negotiating Framework for Turkey’ – Enforcing the limits to member states' discretion in European Union enlargement negotiations – The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice before ratification and after entry into force.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuli MIETTINEN ◽  
Merita KETTUNEN

AbstractThe Court of Justice of the European Union has historically rejected references to preparatory work in the interpretation of EU Treaties. However, the preparatory work for the EURATOM, Maastricht, and Constitutional Treaties have played a role in recent judgments. The ‘explanations’ to the Charter of Fundamental Rights are expressly approved in the current Treaties. We examine the emerging case law on preparatory work. Reference to the drafters’ intent does not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially even ossify historical interpretations. Even if the consequence of their introduction is a conservative interpretation, their use raises questions of transparency and democracy, and complicates the already difficult task of interpreting the EU constitution.


Author(s):  
Maryna Semenova

Problem setting. The Court of the European Union is a central term, which characterizes the entire court system of the European Union, which, without a doubt, includes three lanes: the Court of Justice, the Zagalny Court and special judges. Such an institute is aimed at accepting new acts of legal form and legal significance, and the very decision, the decision of the institution. The acceptance of such acts is a manifestation of the implementation of the judicial competence of the named institution, however, the link with the system is determined by the following: which may be the reason for the nature of precedent practice; both the established stench for the use of the Court itself by the Court of Justice itself, as well as by the other institutions, which have been approved by Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union; what is the decision of the Court EU norms of law EU. Analysis of the meaningful nutrition is the subject of a complete dosage. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The legal meaning of the decision to the Court of the European Union and the possibility of implementing such decisions before the legislation of Ukraine. Target of research is to examine the status of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union as a precedent. Article’s main body. The research is devoted to the analysis of the legal significance of the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the application of acts of the legislation of the Energy Community in the field of energy by the courts of Ukraine in resolving relevant disputes. It is noted that the Court of Justice of the EU is a judicial institution of another legal order, an international organization – the European Union, whose practice is fundamental to the development of the rule of law in the European Union. However, it is stated that the national courts of the EU member states are tasked with the daily application of EU law in accordance with the principles of supremacy, direct action and responsibility of member states for compliance with EU law. It is established that the legal basis for the functioning of the electricity market is the Constitution of Ukraine, special laws, international treaties of Ukraine, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and other legislation of Ukraine, according to which the subjects of power and courts In applying the provisions of this Law, the law enforcement practice of the Energy Community and the European Union shall be taken into account, in particular decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (European Court of Justice, General Court), the European Commission and the Energy Community Secretariat. Conclusions and prospects for the development. A systematic analysis of the norms of national and international law allows us to conclude that the provisions of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU are part of the national legislation of Ukraine, its provisions are mandatory and binding throughout Ukraine. Therefore, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is applicable to the courts of Ukraine in resolving disputes concerning the application of energy legislation in the field of energy by other member states in full in the same manner as for the application of European Court of Human Rights.


Author(s):  
Dmytro Boichuk ◽  
Vitalii Hryhoriev

The article is devoted to the study of the legal nature of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law of the European Union. Within the scope of the doctrinal sources and the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, the authors substantiate the logic of including existing the European Court of Human Rights case law in the EU law sources, citing arguments based on the EU law and the case law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 100-130
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to the sources of EU law.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CoJ) to the sources of EU law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document