MULTIPLE-CONCLUSION LP AND DEFAULT CLASSICALITY

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
JC BEALL

Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of ‘default classicality’. With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such ‘default classicality’ is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.

Author(s):  
Graham Priest

A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything). Sustained work in formal paraconsistent logics started in the early 1960s. A major motivating thought was that there are important naturally occurring inconsistent but non-trivial theories. Some logicians have gone further and claimed that some of these theories may be true. By the mid-1970s, details of the semantics and proof-theories of many paraconsistent logics were well understood. More recent research has focused on the applications of these logics and on their philosophical underpinnings and implications.


2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY HUNTER

Reasoning with inconsistency involves some compromise on classical logic. There is a range of proposals for logics (called paraconsistent logics) for reasoning with inconsistency each with pros and cons. Selecting an appropriate paraconsistent logic for an application depends upon the requirements of the application. Here we review paraconsistent logics for the potentially significant application area of technology for structured text. Structured text is a general concept that is implicit in a variety of approaches to handling information. Syntactically, an item of structured text is a number of grammatically simple phrases together with a semantic label for each phrase. Items of structured text may be nested within larger items of structured text. The semantic labels in a structured text are meant to parameterize a stereotypical situation, and so a particular item of structured text is an instance of that stereotypical situation. Much information is potentially available as structured text, including tagged text in XML, text in relational and object-oriented databases, and the output from information extraction systems in the form of instantiated templates. In this review paper, we formalize the concept of structured text, and then focus on how we can identify inconsistency in items of structured text, and reason with these inconsistencies. Then we review key approaches to paraconsistent reasoning, and discuss the application of them to reasoning with inconsistency in structured text.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Barrio ◽  
Bruno Da Re

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way.


Author(s):  
Dominic Hyde ◽  
Mark Colyvan

The idea that the phenomenon of vagueness might be modelled by a paraconsistent logic has been little discussed in contemporary work on vagueness, just as the idea that paraconsistent logics might be fruitfully applied to the phenomenon of vagueness has been little discussed in contemporary work on paraconsistency. This is prima facie surprising given that the earliest formalisations of paraconsistent logics presented in Jáskowski and Halldén were presented as logics of vagueness. One possible explanation for this is that, despite initial advocacy by pioneers of paraconsistency, the prospects for a paraconsistent account of vagueness are so poor as to warrant little further consideration. In this paper we look at the reasons that might be offered in defence of this negative claim. As we shall show, they are far from compelling. Paraconsistent accounts of vagueness deserve further attention.


Author(s):  
ZUOQUAN LIN

In this paper we describe the paraconsistent circumscription by the application of predicate circumscription in a paraconsistent logic, the logic of paradox LP. In addition to circumscribing the predicates, we also circumscribe the inconsistency. The paraconsistent circumscription can be well characterized by the minimal semantics which is both nonmonotonic and paraconsistent. It brings us advantages in two respects: nonmonotonic logic would be nontrivial while there was a contradiction, and paraconsistent logic would be equivalent to classical logic while there was no effect of a contradiction.


Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Colin R. Caret

AbstractThis paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael (2016) calls this the non-triviality strategy (NTS). He argues that this strategy fails in its purpose. I will show that Michael's criticism significantly over-reaches. The fundamental problem is that he places more of a burden on the advocate of paraconsistency than on the advocate of classical logic. The weaknesses in Michael's argument are symptomatic of this preferential treatment of one viewpoint in the debate over another. He does, however, make important observations that allow us to clarify some of the complexities involved in giving a logical reconstruction of a theory. I will argue that there are abductive arguments deserving of further consideration for the claim that paraconsistent logic offers the best explanation of the practice of inconsistent science. In this sense, the debate is still very much open.


2004 ◽  
Vol 171 (4S) ◽  
pp. 249-249
Author(s):  
Paulo Palma ◽  
Cassio Riccetto ◽  
Marcelo Thiel ◽  
Miriam Dambros ◽  
Rogerio Fraga ◽  
...  

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-85
Author(s):  
Donald E. Weber ◽  
William H. Burke

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