Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: An International Law Response, by Vernon J.C. Rive Edward Elgar, 2019, 320 pp, £90 hb ISBN 9781785360886

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-192
Author(s):  
Harro van Asselt
2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 346-349
Author(s):  
Vernon JC Rive ◽  
Rafaela Oliari

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Coxhead ◽  
Corbett Grainger

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread in developing countries, where reform efforts are often derailed by disputes over the likely distribution of gains and losses. The impacts of subsidy reform are transmitted to households through changes in energy prices and prices of other goods and services, as well as through factor earnings. Most empirical studies focus on consumer expenditures alone, and computable general equilibrium analyses typically report only total effects without decomposing them by source. Meanwhile, analytical models neglect important open-economy characteristics relevant to developing countries. In this paper, we develop an analytical model of a small open economy with a preexisting fossil fuel subsidy and identify direct and indirect impacts of subsidy reform on real household incomes. Our results, illustrated with data from Viet Nam, highlight two important drivers of distributional change: (i) the mix of tradable and nontradable goods, reflecting the structure of a trade-dependent economy; and (ii) household heterogeneity in sources of factor income.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Blondeel ◽  
Jeff Colgan ◽  
Thijs Van de Graaf

Why do some international norms succeed, whereas others fail? We argue that norm campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe are framed as a solution to salient problems that potential adopters face, even if different from the problem that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. For instance, the campaign to reduce environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies has been more effective when linked to fiscal stability, a common problem that policy makers face. Problem linkages can thus bolster the attractiveness of a proposed new norm and broaden the coalition of actors that support the norm. We probe the plausibility of this argument by studying two campaigns that aim to shift patterns of finance for fossil fuel production and consumption: subsidy reform and divestment. Subsidy reform encourages governments to reduce subsidies for products like gasoline; divestment encourages investors to sell or avoid equity stocks from fossil fuel industries. We look at the variation in the impact of these two campaigns over time and argue that they have achieved institutional acceptance and implementation chiefly when their advocates have been able to link environmental goals with other goals, usually economic ones.


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