Predicting decision making behavior from personality and cognitive variables.

1965 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Townsend ◽  
Walter J. Smith
2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorien Veldwijk ◽  
Brigitte A.B. Essers ◽  
Mattijs S. Lambooij ◽  
Carmen D. Dirksen ◽  
Henriette A. Smit ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan A. Sugam ◽  
Jeremy J. Day ◽  
R. Mark Wightman ◽  
Regina M. Carelli

1981 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerel A. Rosati

The bureaucratic politics model has achieved great popularity in the study of decision making. Yet too often the term “bureaucratic politics” is used by scholars and practitioners without clearly stating its policy application. The decision-making behavior that occurred during the Johnson and Nixon administrations for SALT I serves to illustrate many of the limits of the model. First, the decision-making structure posited by the bureaucratic politics model is not nearly as prevalent within the executive branch as is commonly assumed. Second, even where the bureaucratic politics structure is present, the decision-making process is not always one of bargaining, compromise, and consensus. Finally, the decision context and the decision participants are ignored in the model. To provide a clearer understanding of policy-making behavior, a more systematic decision-making framework is offered, which should contribute to the development of better model- and theory-building.


2013 ◽  
Vol 96 (7) ◽  
pp. 4751-4758 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.A. Russell ◽  
J.M. Bewley

1964 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 315-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Antoinette Ryan ◽  
John D. Krumboltz

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liying Li ◽  
Yong Wang

This study investigates the channel coordination issue of a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to sales effort. Under the loss-averse newsvendor setting, a distribution-free gain/loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract has been shown to be able to coordinate the supply chain. However, we find that a GLB contract remains ineffective in managing the supply chain when retailer sales efforts influence the demand. To effectively coordinate the channel, we propose to combine a GLB contract with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract. In addition, we discover a special class of gain/loss contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and the retailer. We then analyze the effect of loss aversion on the retailer’s decision-making behavior and supply chain performance. Finally, we perform a numerical study to illustrate the findings and gain additional insights.


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