Visual Perspective in Memory Affects Regret for Inactions and Actions

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.

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The Plurality of Perspectives

10.1093/oso/9780190674267.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher McCarroll

Keyword(s):

Autobiographical Memory ◽

Sports Psychology ◽

Visual Perspective ◽

Emotional Imagery ◽

Kinesthetic Imagery

There is a second problem with Vendler’s proposed reduction of “objective” imaginings (from-the-outside) to “subjective” imaginings (from-the-inside): it dismisses the possibility of seeing oneself from-the-outside while still maintaining internal or embodied perspectives such as kinesthetic imagery. Yet internal and external perspectives can often come together or come apart in interesting ways: there is a plurality of perspectives. Evidence for the claim that an external visual perspective may coexist and align with internal embodied and emotional imagery is explored by drawing on examples from autobiographical memory, cinema, and sports psychology. Observer perspectives are memories in which one sees oneself from-the-outside, but one may still maintain internal embodied and emotional imagery and there need be no inherent feeling of detachment.

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Remembering From-the-Outside

10.1093/oso/9780190674267.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher McCarroll

Keyword(s):

Empirical Evidence ◽

Point Of View ◽

Philosophical Analysis ◽

Visual Perspective ◽

Observer Perspective ◽

The Status ◽

Key Issues ◽

Way Of Thinking

This chapter sets out some key issues related to a philosophical analysis of point of view in memory. It does so by looking at examples of psychological, philosophical, and literary accounts of the phenomenon, as well as examples of the author’s own observer perspective memories. The chapter provides an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to visual perspective in memory. Despite these consistent empirical findings, however, a number of doubts and misconceptions about remembering from-the-outside still linger, especially concerning the status of observer perspectives in memory. This chapter outlines some of the skepticism to the possibility of remembering from-the-outside and points to a possible diagnosis of why such skepticism arises. This chapter points to a way of thinking about memory—to be developed through the course of the book—which eases the worries about remembering from-the-outside.

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Remembering from the Outside

10.1093/oso/9780190674267.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christopher McCarroll

Keyword(s):

The Self ◽

Perceptual Content ◽

Visual Perspective ◽

Personal Memory ◽

External Observer ◽

Cognitive Domains ◽

Past Event ◽

Observer Perspective ◽

Ways Of Thinking ◽

Original Event

When recalling events that one personally experienced, one often visualizes the remembered scene as one originally saw it: from an internal visual perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an external “observer perspective.” In such cases one remembers from-the-outside. This book is about such memories. Remembering from-the-outside is a common yet curious case of personal memory: one views oneself from a perspective one seemingly could not have had at the time of the original event. How can past events be recalled from a detached perspective? How is it that the self is observed? And how can we account for the self-presence of such memories? Indeed, can there be genuine memories recalled from-the-outside? If memory preserves past perceptual content then how can one see oneself from-the-outside in memory? This book disentangles the puzzles posed by remembering from-the-outside. The book develops a dual-faceted approach for thinking about memory, which acknowledges constructive and reconstructive processes at encoding and at retrieval, and it uses this approach to defend the possibility of genuine memories being recalled from-the-outside. In so doing it also elucidates the nature of such memories and sheds light on the nature of personal memory. The book argues that field and observer perspectives are different ways of thinking about a particular past event. Further, by exploring the ways we have of getting outside of ourselves in memory and other cognitive domains, the book sheds light on the nature of our perspectival minds.

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