Are all third-person-perspective memories created equal? An examination of visual perspective use during autobiographical memory retrieval

Author(s):  
Heather J. Rice ◽  
David C. Rubin
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Orquiola Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi ◽  
Michael Jenkins

Previous neurophysiological research suggests that there are event-related potential (ERP) components are associated with empathy for pain: early affective component (N2) and two late cognitive components (P3/LPP). The current study investigated whether and how the visual perspective from which a painful event is observed affects these ERP components. Participants viewed images of hands in pain vs. not in pain from a first-person or third-person perspective. We found that visual perspective influences both the early and late components. In the early component (N2), there was a larger mean amplitude during observation of pain vs no-pain exclusively when images were shown from a first-person perspective. We suggest that this effect may be driven by misattributing the on-screen hand to oneself. For the late component (P3), we found a larger effect of pain on mean amplitudes in response to third-person relative to first-person images. We speculate that the P3 may reflect a later process that enables effective recognition of others’ pain in the absence of misattribution. We discuss our results in relation to self- vs other-related processing by questioning whether these ERP components are truly indexing empathy (an other-directed process) or a simple misattribution of another’s pain as one’s own (a self-directed process).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sima Ebrahimian ◽  
Bradley Mattan ◽  
Mazaher Rezaei

Abstract Background: Lack of empathy is one of the main characteristics of narcissists. However, it is not clear whether there is a similar deficit in other facets of mentalizing, such as perspective-taking.Method: In this study, we measured the taking visual perspectives ascribed to different targets (e.g., first-person self, third-person self-avatar, and third-person stranger avatar). Our study focused on separate groups of individuals with high and low self-reported narcissistic traits. Results: Participants reporting high Narcissism scores showed higher accuracy in a third-person perspective-taking task than did their low-Narcissism counterparts. However, when the first-person perspective was incongruent with the third-person (first person vs. self- tagged avatar), the accuracy of their responses decreased.Conclusions: The discrepancy between the two types of perspective taking of people with high narcissism can probably mean that the narcissistic people perfectly identify / empathize with one object (person, avatar, character, etc.) and therefore their perspective-taking is disrupted when they need to identify with more than one object that represent their self-attributed perspectives.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Masahiro Hirai ◽  
Takeshi Sakurada ◽  
Jun Izawa ◽  
Takahiro Ikeda ◽  
Yukifumi Monden ◽  
...  

AbstractDifficulties with visual perspective-taking among individuals with autism spectrum disorders remain poorly understood. Many studies have presumed that first-person visual input can be mentally transformed to a third-person perspective during visual perspective-taking tasks; however, existing research has not fully revealed the computational strategy used by those with autism spectrum disorders for taking another person’s perspective. In this study, we designed a novel approach to test a strategy using the opposite-directional effect among children with autism spectrum disorders. This effect refers to how a third-person perspective as a visual input alters a cognitive process. We directly manipulated participants’ visual perspective by placing a camera at different positions; participants could watch themselves from a third-person perspective during a reaching task with no endpoint feedback. During a baseline task, endpoint bias (with endpoint feedback but no visual transformation) did not differ significantly between groups. However, the endpoint was affected by extrinsic coordinate information in the control group relative to the autism spectrum disorders group when the visual perspective was transformed. These results indicate an increased reliance on proprioception during the reaching task with perspective manipulation in the autism spectrum disorders group.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu

The human brain and the human language are precisely constructed together by evolution/genes, so that in the objective world, a human brain can tell a story to another brain in human language which describes an imagined multiplayer game; in this story, one player of the game represents the human brain itself. It’s possible that the human kind doesn’t really have a subjective world (doesn’t really have conscious experience). An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. Psychologically, a third-person perspective and a new, dedicated personality state are required to bear the totally global fatalism, to avoid severe cognitive dissonance with our default first-person perspective and our original personality state.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Renata Zieminska

The paper presents the concept of masculinity within the non-binary and multilayered model of gender/sex traits. Within that model, masculinity is not a simple idea, but rather is fragmented into many traits in diverse clusters. The experience of transgender men and men with intersex traits suggests that self-determined male gender identity is a mega trait that is sufficient for being a man. However, masculinity is not only psychological, as the content of the psychological feeling of being a man refers to social norms about how men should be and behave. And male coded traits are described as traits that frequently occur within the group of people identifying as men. Therefore, I claim that there are two interdependent ideas in the concept of masculinity: the self-determined male gender identity (first-person perspective) and a cluster of traits coded as male (third-person perspective). Within non-binary model the interplay between the two interdependent ideas allows to include borderline masculinities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.


Author(s):  
Andy Miah

This chapter examines how spectator encounter digital technology in sport, which reveals a blurring of participation and spectating. It also proposes that spectating is changing through the development of digital interactive experiences, such as urban screens, TV on demand, mobile technology, and social media, creating a new form of remote participation. The chapter also asks considers that the concept of spectator no longer makes sense in the context of an immersive viewing experience, where the witness is brought into the space of the activity, rather than simply occupying a third person perspective.


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