It is commonly assumed that, during perceptual decisions, the brain integrates stimulus evidence until reaching a decision, and then performs the response. There are conditions, however (e.g. time pressure), in which the initiation of the response must be prepared in anticipation of the stimulus presentation. It is therefore not clear when the timing and the choice of perceptual responses depend exclusively on evidence accumulation, or when preparatory motor signals may interfere with this process. Here, we find that, in a free reaction time auditory discrimination task in rats, the timing of fast responses does not depend on the stimulus, although the choices do, suggesting a decoupling of the mechanisms of action initiation and choice selection. This behavior is captured by a novel model, the Parallel Sensory Integration and Action Model (PSIAM), in which response execution is triggered whenever one of two processes, Action Initiation or Evidence Accumulation, reaches a bound, while choice category is always set by the latter. Based on this separation, the model accurately predicts the distribution of reaction times when the stimulus is omitted, advanced or delayed. Furthermore, we show that changes in Action Initiation mediates both post-error slowing and a gradual slowing of the responses within each session. Overall, these results extend the standard models of perceptual decision-making, and shed a new light on the interaction between action preparation and evidence accumulation.
Two stages of attentional filtering during sequential evidence integration in human perceptual decision-making
