Phantom limbs, the self, and the mind-body problem: Comment on R. Melzack.

This chapter turns to philosophers and artists, seeking their views on the dilemma of consciousness and the self, as well as the related mind/body problem. Does consciousness – and personal experience – arise from the neurological functions of the brain (and if so, how), or is it but a shard of the flow of universal consciousness – and if so, is the mind only a channel of energy and should we forget about our cognitive functions, or train to use them in a different way? What does it mean to have a strong sense of personal identity – where does the ‘true self' lie? Having learnt from neuroscientists and most psychologists that our self seems to exceed the scope and depth of both body and mind, we hope that philosophy and art might guide us towards this ‘other' realm where our sense of identity emerges from.

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ESSAY 8 COMMENTS ON THE PREHISTORIC DISCOVERY OF THE SELF AND ON THE MIND–BODY PROBLEM IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

The World of Parmenides ◽

10.4324/9780203120361-16 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 272-302

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

The Self ◽

Greek Philosophy ◽

Ancient Greek ◽

Ancient Greek Philosophy ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

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1. ‘Who am I?’ Identity in philosophy

Identity: A Very Short Introduction ◽

10.1093/actrade/9780198828549.003.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 6-15

Author(s):

Florian Coulmas

Keyword(s):

Personal Identity ◽

Body Problem ◽

Ordinary Language ◽

The Self ◽

Individual Identity ◽

Self Awareness ◽

Language Analysis ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

The question of how consciousness and self-awareness connect with personal identity has accompanied philosophy since antiquity. Sages of diverse orientations have put forth various elaborate answers, showing among other things that self-awareness is more than just being conscious. The ensouled matter of the self-conscious brain still poses deeply puzzling questions about individual identity, and nowadays the new reality of anthropo-technology once again poses the question how we can know about ourselves. ‘ “Who am I?” Identity in philosophy’ considers the concept of identity in philosophy through time and the mind–body problem. It also discusses empiricist reductionism, mentalist essentialism, ordinary language analysis, and interactionism.

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The Mind-Body Problem Revisited

Contemporary Psychology ◽

10.1037/0013579 ◽

1975 ◽

Vol 20 (8) ◽

pp. 660-660

Author(s):

MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽

ARNOLD SCHEIBEL

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

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Zombies and Dolls

10.1093/oso/9780198728443.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Marcello Massimini ◽

Giulio Tononi

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Turing Test ◽

Hard Problem ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Hard Problem ◽

The Mind ◽

The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

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Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

James Van Cleve

Keyword(s):

Body Problem ◽

Necessary Truths ◽

Mind Body Problem ◽

The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

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