The significance of the Asian fertility transition can hardly
be overestimated. The relatively sanguine view of population growth
expressed at the 1994 International Conference for Population and
Development (ICPD) in Cairo was possible only because of the demographic
events in Asia over the last 30 years. In 1965 Asian women were still
bearing about six children. Even at current rates, today’s young women
will give birth to half as many. This measure, namely the average number
of live births over a reproductive lifetime, is called the total
fertility rate. It has to be above 2— considerably above if mortality is
still high—to achieve long-term population replacement. By 1995 East
Asia, taken as a whole, exhibited a total fertility rate of 1.9.
Elsewhere, Singapore was below long-term replacement, Thailand had just
achieved it, and Sri Lanka was only a little above. The role of Asia in
the global fertility transition is shown by estimates I made a few years
ago for a World Bank Planning Meeting covering the first quarter of a
century of the Asian transition [Caldwell (1993), p. 300]. Between 1965
and 1988 the world’s annual birth rate fell by 22 percent. In 1988 there
would have been 40 million more births if there had been no decline from
1965 fertility levels. Of that total decline in the world’s births,
almost 80 percent had been contributed by Asia, compared with only 10
percent by Latin America, nothing by Africa, and, unexpectedly, 10
percent by the high-income countries of the West. Indeed, 60 percent of
the decline was produced by two countries, China and India, even though
they constitute only 38 percent of the world’s population. They
accounted, between them, for over threequarters of Asia’s fall in
births.
Ancient genomes indicate population replacement in Early Neolithic Britain