The Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals

Author(s):  
Jerold Waltman
1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.


2020 ◽  
pp. 208-222
Author(s):  
Paul J. Magnarella

Attorney Paul Magnarella filed another petition with the Federal District Court asserting that during O’Neal’s 1970 trial, Jean Young, a key witness for the prosecution, had falsely claimed to have forgotten that she had received numerous payments from the FBI for information. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent James Moore lied on the witness stand when he said he had not heard of Jean Young receiving FBI payments for information. FBI records established that Jean M. Young had gone by at least seven different surnames, had been arrested three times by Kansas City, Missouri, police, had received a total of fourteen payments from the FBI for information, and had provided information to the FBI on Pete O’Neal. ATF agent Moore testified that he did not know of Young’s paid informant status, even though he later would write that both Young and an FBI agent had told him before the 1970 trial that Young was a paid informant. Magnarella argued that the prosecution was required to reveal to the judge, jury, and defense any evidence that reflects negatively on its witnesses. Failure to do so should result in a new trial.


Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This chapter recounts the federal district court injunction proceeding instituted by the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to stop Jersey City from denying leafletting rights and public-speaking permits. Revealing the hearing’s nastiness, the chapter shows that the trial had legal significance beyond exposing Mayor Hague’s misdeeds, as it tested whether Jersey City’s claim of traditional municipal police powers against alleged CIO communists or the ACLU’s new vision of nationally protected speech and assembly rights for workers would prevail, and indeed, whether federal courts would accept jurisdiction. With law in flux, the chapter concludes, the district court broke new ground by assuming jurisdiction, rejecting Jersey City’s old legal vision, embracing new ACLU views, and enjoining Jersey City as requested.


Author(s):  
Bruce J. Dierenfield ◽  
David A. Gerber

This chapter examines and analyzes the five-year journey of Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) from the federal district court in Tucson to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court. William Bentley Ball, the Zobrests’ attorney, and John Richardson, the school district’s attorney, clashed over whether the Establishment Clause permitted any government aid to a Catholic school. Many religious and civil libertarian groups—but just one national deaf association—filed arguments to sway the court. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote the majority decision favoring the Zobrests, misunderstood the complicated function of a sign language interpreter to permit what he regarded as incidental parochial school aid. Rehnquist maintained the aid was permissible because the plaintiffs and their deaf son were its main beneficiaries.


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