OPTID: Optimal Incentives and Disincentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

Download Full-text

Out of Options? Optimal Incentives and Industry Dynamics

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.972671 ◽

2007 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Antonio Falato ◽

Dalida Kadyrzhanova

Keyword(s):

Industry Dynamics ◽

Optimal Incentives

Download Full-text

Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Review of Industrial Organization ◽

10.1007/s11151-021-09815-0 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Enrico Böhme ◽

Jonas Severin Frank ◽

Wolfgang Kerber

Keyword(s):

Pharmaceutical Industry ◽

Market Entry ◽

Consumer Welfare ◽

Antitrust Law ◽

Patent Litigation ◽

Weak Patents ◽

Optimal Incentives

AbstractIn this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.

Download Full-text

Optimal Inequality/Optimal Incentives: Evidence from a Tournament

10.3386/w12588 ◽

2006 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Richard Freeman ◽

Alexander Gelber

Keyword(s):

Optimal Inequality ◽

Optimal Incentives

Download Full-text

Optimal Incentives in Core‐Selecting Auctions

The Handbook of Market Design ◽

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.003.0012 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 282-298 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Robert Day ◽

Paul Milgrom

Keyword(s):

Optimal Incentives

Download Full-text

Optimal Incentives for Electric Vehicles at e-Park & Ride Hub with Renewable Energy Source

World Electric Vehicle Journal ◽

10.3390/wevj10040070 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 70 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Benoît Sohet ◽

Olivier Beaude ◽

Yezekael Hayel ◽

Alban Jeandin

Keyword(s):

Energy Source ◽

Electric Vehicles ◽

Traffic Congestion ◽

Theory Model ◽

Urban Systems ◽

Production Data ◽

Solar Panels ◽

Incentive Mechanisms ◽

Electrical Grid ◽

Optimal Incentives

As electric vehicles’ penetration increases, more impacts on urban systems are observed and related to both driving (e.g., on traffic congestion and reduced pollution) and charging (e.g., on the electrical grid). Therefore, there is a need to design coupled incentive mechanisms. To propose and numerically evaluate such incentives, a game theory model is adopted. Its originality comes from the coupling between the charging cost and the driving decisions: to drive downtown or to charge at an e-Park & Ride hub with solar panels and then take public transport, in order to reach destination. Optimal ticket fares and solar park’s size are computed using real photovoltaic production data.

Download Full-text