Assessing gains of trade in monopolistic competition under the presence of industry leaders

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Martin Alfaro
Author(s):  
Avinash Dixit

If formal institutions of contract governance are absent or ineffective, traders try to substitute relational governance based on norms and sanctions. However, these alternatives need good information and communication concerning members’ actions; that works well only in relatively small communities. If there are fixed costs, the market has too few firms for perfect competition. The optimum must be a second best, balancing the effectiveness of contract governance and dead-weight loss of monopoly. This chapter explores this idea using a spatial model with monopolistic competition. It is found that relational governance constrains the size of firms and can cause inefficiently excessive entry, beyond the excess that already occurs in a spatial model without governance problems. Effects of alternative methods of improving governance to ameliorate this inefficiency are explored.


Author(s):  
Sara Emamgholipour ◽  
Lotfali Agheli

Purpose As the pharmaceutical industry is one of the key sectors of the health-care system, the identification of its structure is of particular importance. This paper aims to determine the structure of the pharmaceutical industry in Iran to provide appropriate solutions for pricing and regulation by policymakers. Iran is a growing pharmaceutical market with over $4bn in sales, so the supply side needs to be examined to meet the domestic consumption. Design/methodology/approach This research is a descriptive and retrospective analytical study which examines the Iranian pharmaceutical industry through library studies and using pharmaceutical data of the country’s Food and Drug Administration during 1992-2016. Due to data availability in firm level, the concentration ratio of N leading firms and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index are used to measure the concentration of the pharmaceutical market in 2014 and 2016. Findings The results show that pharmaceutical manufacturing, importing companies and distributing companies play roles in monopolistic competition market, loose oligopoly market and oligopoly market, respectively. For all companies, the magnitudes of Herfindahl–Hirschman indices indicate non-competitive settings. As a result, these companies set their own prices, and market demand affects their sales. In addition, demand for medicines is shaped in the form of supply-induced demand. Research limitations/implications This research was accomplished with no computational limitation. However, it was confined to only one country, one industry and the mentioned period of study. Practical implications The pharmaceutical manufacturers have no influence on medicine prices, and government pricing regulations lessen the market power of such market agents. However, the easy entry to and exit from market stimulate producers to participate in manufacturing activities. The pharmaceutical importers may expand their imports in response to entry new actors; however, the new entrants weaken the coordination on pricing decisions. Social implications As pharmaceutical distributers act in an oligopoly market, they can collude, reduce competition and lower the welfare of pharmaceutical consumers. In such conditions, high investment requirements and economies of scale may discourage the entry of new firms. Originality/value Although there are various studies on market structure in non-pharmaceutical industries, this study is a new effort to measure concentration in the Iranian pharmaceutical market and to determine its structure.


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