Enforcing authoritarian rule over building state capacities: foreign military assistance in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Upper Volta 1958–1974

Author(s):  
Riina Turtio
2021 ◽  
pp. 116-146
Author(s):  
Marco Wyss

In contrast to his Nigerian counterpart, the Ivorian leader did not have to face any meaningful opposition, and could rely on a strong presidential constitution, a one-party system, and his moral and tribal authority. But fearful of the potential of foreign-, especially Ghanaian-sponsored subversion to his regime, he entered into secret arrangements that put French forces in charge of his personal and regime’s security. When in 1963 subversion became a reality in francophone Africa, Houphouët-Boigny became increasingly paranoid. Detecting subversive activities and coup attempts in Côte d’Ivoire itself, he thus moved against supposed conspirators and simultaneously reasserted his authoritarian rule. The French support he thereby received was, however, limited, because Paris was concerned that too heavy an involvement in the domestic security of African states could be detrimental to its international reputation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 187-222
Author(s):  
Marco Wyss

In contrast to Nigeria, there had not been any real planning for the creation of national armed forces in Côte d’Ivoire in the late 1950s. Houphouët-Boigny relied on the protection of the French-led Community army, and de Gaulle continued to expect Ivorian contributions in manpower. The situation changed, however, in the wake of the abrupt end of the Community and Houphouët-Boigny’s sudden march towards independence. Despite Franco-Ivorian frictions during the transfer of power, however, the Ivorian leader expected and could eventually count on French military assistance. But France’s exclusive military assistance role nevertheless came to be challenged from unexpected quarters, with the Ivorian civic service being built up with Israeli assistance. But even though the French were at the time probably the Israelis’ closest Western security partners, and retained control of the purely military assistance to the Ivorian armed forces, they actively and successively sought to reduce Israel’s involvement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 62-90
Author(s):  
Marco Wyss

Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s plans to develop his country within the French Community were shattered when in late 1959 the Community came to an early end. In response, and in order to burnish his African nationalist and leadership credentials, he refused to remain in a ‘renovated’ Community and to enter into cooperation agreements with Paris prior to independence. This strongly irritated Charles de Gaulle, who wanted to retain France’s sphere of influence in Africa and was concerned that Houphouët-Boigny’s example could lead to challenges from other former colonies. But the Ivorian leader, flanked by his allies from the Council of the Entente, stood firm, and Côte d’Ivoire became independent in summer 1960. Moreover, he succeeded in forcing de Gaulle to abandon his plans for a common French-led defence in francophone Africa, and obtained from France bespoke defence and military assistance agreements for the Entente in spring 1961.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-374
Author(s):  
A. Yao ◽  
A. Hué ◽  
J. Danho ◽  
P. Koffi-Dago ◽  
M. Sanogo ◽  
...  

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