Introduction

After showcasing the discrepancy between Britain’s and France’s postcolonial security roles in Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, and Africa more generally, the introduction presents the major actors—Britain, France, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire—their underlying motivations and positions, and how they were affected not only by global, but importantly also by local and regional circumstances. Therefore, and to set the scene for the comparative analysis of the making of the Anglo-Nigerian and Franco-Ivorian postcolonial security relationships, the introduction then provides an extensive discussion of Africa’s Cold War and African agency. Thereafter, it provides a discussion of sources and, finally, presents the architecture of the book.

The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement

The British government only agreed to Nigerian independence once the colonial secretary and the minister of defence had secured a Nigerian commitment to a defence agreement in 1958. But by setting a date for independence, Britain lost a substantial degree of leverage. Meanwhile, the Nigerian government came under pressure; indirectly from the rise of pan-Africanism and non-alignment, and directly from the emergence of an opposition following the elections of 1959. The negotiations for the actual defence agreement thus became more arduous for the British. The combined strength of the ruling parties, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), eventually assured its safe passage in the Nigerian parliament. But simultaneously, it exposed the Balewa government to criticism that it undermined Nigeria’s independence and declared foreign policy of non-alignment.

Conclusion

In the early hours of 15 January 1966, the so-called majors’ coup was set in motion in Nigeria. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was first kidnapped, and then murdered by the roadside when the insurgents had to flee Lagos in the face of advancing loyal army units. Many of the Nigerian prime minister’s closest political associates and high-ranking military leaders shared the same or at least a similar destiny....

The Ivorian Regime and the French Security Guarantee

In contrast to his Nigerian counterpart, the Ivorian leader did not have to face any meaningful opposition, and could rely on a strong presidential constitution, a one-party system, and his moral and tribal authority. But fearful of the potential of foreign-, especially Ghanaian-sponsored subversion to his regime, he entered into secret arrangements that put French forces in charge of his personal and regime’s security. When in 1963 subversion became a reality in francophone Africa, Houphouët-Boigny became increasingly paranoid. Detecting subversive activities and coup attempts in Côte d’Ivoire itself, he thus moved against supposed conspirators and simultaneously reasserted his authoritarian rule. The French support he thereby received was, however, limited, because Paris was concerned that too heavy an involvement in the domestic security of African states could be detrimental to its international reputation.

British Leadership Questioned

During the transfer of power, the British built up the Nigerian armed forces, and both London and Lagos expected Britain to remain Nigeria’s main provider of military assistance after independence. But Britain’s military assistance role in Nigeria came to be questioned in the wake of the row over the defence agreement. Fearful of accusations from the opposition and African neighbours of neocolonial collusion with the former imperial power, Lagos began to search for alternative sources of military assistance. But their Western orientation and underpinning anti-communist sentiments prevented the Nigerians from turning to the Soviet bloc. Instead, they approached Commonwealth and/or non-aligned powers, as well as medium, lesser, and/or neutral European countries. Eventually, the FRG became responsible for the build-up of Nigeria’s air force. Although this was a major setback for the British, they consoled themselves that the Nigerian air force was at least in safe, Western hands.

A French Prerogative

In contrast to Nigeria, there had not been any real planning for the creation of national armed forces in Côte d’Ivoire in the late 1950s. Houphouët-Boigny relied on the protection of the French-led Community army, and de Gaulle continued to expect Ivorian contributions in manpower. The situation changed, however, in the wake of the abrupt end of the Community and Houphouët-Boigny’s sudden march towards independence. Despite Franco-Ivorian frictions during the transfer of power, however, the Ivorian leader expected and could eventually count on French military assistance. But France’s exclusive military assistance role nevertheless came to be challenged from unexpected quarters, with the Ivorian civic service being built up with Israeli assistance. But even though the French were at the time probably the Israelis’ closest Western security partners, and retained control of the purely military assistance to the Ivorian armed forces, they actively and successively sought to reduce Israel’s involvement.

The Franco-Ivorian Cooperation Agreements

Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s plans to develop his country within the French Community were shattered when in late 1959 the Community came to an early end. In response, and in order to burnish his African nationalist and leadership credentials, he refused to remain in a ‘renovated’ Community and to enter into cooperation agreements with Paris prior to independence. This strongly irritated Charles de Gaulle, who wanted to retain France’s sphere of influence in Africa and was concerned that Houphouët-Boigny’s example could lead to challenges from other former colonies. But the Ivorian leader, flanked by his allies from the Council of the Entente, stood firm, and Côte d’Ivoire became independent in summer 1960. Moreover, he succeeded in forcing de Gaulle to abandon his plans for a common French-led defence in francophone Africa, and obtained from France bespoke defence and military assistance agreements for the Entente in spring 1961.

British Partner

Washington was largely a bystander during the transfer of power in Nigeria. Yet London and Lagos saw a postcolonial role for the United States in Nigeria as a provider of development aid, and the Americans increasingly identified Nigeria as a key state in Africa. After independence, this led to an Anglo-American ‘burden-sharing’ in Nigeria, wherein London was responsible for defence and military assistance and Washington became the main provider of development aid. But following the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement, and in search of alternative sources of military assistance, the Nigerians began to approach Washington with requests for military assistance. The Americans, who wanted to focus on development aid, were hesitant. But eventually, increasing domestic instability, regional tensions, and what was perceived as a communist offensive in West Africa convinced Washington to militarize its aid policy in close consultation with the British.

The Demise of the Anglo-Nigerian Special Relationship

Although the defence agreement with Britain had been passed by the Nigerian parliament in late 1960, the Nigerian opposition intensified its campaign against it by portraying it as a neocolonial scheme that ran contrary to Nigeria’s official position of non-alignment. In this opposition it was supported by and galvanized radical movements, trade union members, students, and the youth more generally, who staged demonstrations and even riots in Lagos and other Nigerian cities. The Ghanaian leader joined in the campaign, which gained in strength against the background of the escalating Cold War in Africa and French atomic tests in the Sahara. The British thus questioned whether the defence agreement’s decreasing strategic benefits were worth the political backlash that undermined Britain’s and the West’s position in Nigeria and forced Lagos to demonstrate its non-alignment by cosying up to the Soviet Union. As a result, the defence agreement was eventually abrogated in early 1962.

French Rival

Faced with the potential withdrawal of French military assistance during his clash with de Gaulle during the transfer of power, Houphouët-Boigny enquired about potential American assistance. Neither the Eisenhower nor, at first, the Kennedy administration wanted to challenge the French in their sphere of influence. But the spectre of US military assistance began to haunt Paris, and influenced it to make concessions during the negotiations for the cooperation agreements. After independence, US policymakers were increasingly less inclined to fully defer to French sensitivities, and decided to provide a modicum of military assistance to the Entente states. With the French seeing the Americans as rivals in Africa, Houphouët-Boigny exploited the prospect of a heavier US involvement in the Ivorian security sector to extract additional military assistance from Paris and, eventually, to retain a French military presence in Côte d’Ivoire despite France’s planned withdrawal in line with its force reductions in Africa.