Connecting Institutional Economics to Communitarian Philosophy: Beyond Market Institutions and Pecuniary Canons of Value

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 634-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denilson Beal ◽  
Marco Cavalieri
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Communitarian Philosophy

scholarly journals Experiments as a Tool of Verifying Efficiency of Implicitly Agreed-Upon Market Organizations

Ekonomika ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał M. Jakubowski ◽  
Paweł Kuśmierczyk
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Potential Market ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Market Organization

We analyse the possibility of an experimental study of the efficiency of market institutional structures. In the paper “On the new institutionalism of markets: the market as an organization” by R. Richter, the implicitly agreed upon market organization is regarded as a Nash equilibrium of a game between potential market participants. The solution of such coordination problem is not necessarily Pareto-efficient but could be efficient given assumptions of New Institutional Economics (i. e. could be NIE-efficient). This framework can be very helpful as a descriptive tool used to explain the persistence or transition of market institutions, but in can be difficult to be verified empirically.Economic experiments have been successfully applied to analyse market institutions and to compare their efficiency. In the paper, we demonstrate how this methodology could be used to analyse the “spontaneous” market organizations reached as a tacit agreement in a coordination problem. We also advocate that economic experiments can be a very useful tool to verify the efficiency of such institutions.

Business-groups in Russian industries

2004 ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Organization And Management ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Main Determinants ◽  
Soviet Economic System

The chapter of “Institutional Economics” textbook is devoted to the development of business-groups as a specific feature of industrial organization in the Russian economy. The main determinants of forming and functioning of business-groups such as allocation of property rights in Soviet enterprises, networks of directors and executive authorities in the Soviet economic system as well as import of new institutes and inefficient state enforcement are in the center of analysis. Origins, structure, organization and management within the groups and the role of shareholding and informal control rights are considered.

Beyond Market: Institutions of Governance in the Complex World (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2009 - Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom)

2010 ◽  
pp. 82-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ya. Kuzminov ◽  
M. Yudkevich
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Nobel Prize ◽  
Organization Theory ◽  
Development Studies ◽  
Complex World ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Institutional Economic

The article surveys the main lines of research conducted by Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom - 2009 Nobel Prize winners in economics. Williamsons and Ostroms contribution to understanding the nature of institutions and choice over institutional options are discussed. The role their work played in evolution of modern institutional economic theory is analyzed in detail, as well as interconnections between Williamsons and Ostroms ideas and the most recent research developments in organization theory, behavioral economics and development studies.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

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