Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibility

1981 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Graham
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
American Medical ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Passive Euthanasia ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Active And Passive Euthanasia ◽  
Free Will Defense

The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and to the exoneration of God for the production of evil. In particular, I shall try to show, first, that the American Medical Association's recent attempt to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia is seriously defective. Second, I shall try to show that a popular version of the so-called Free Will Defense of God for Evil is also seriously defective.

Killing and Letting Die: An Irrelevant Distinction to Bioethics

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 383-396
Author(s):  
Mohammad Manzoor Malik
Keyword(s):  
American Medical ◽  
Medical Profession ◽  
Terminally Ill ◽  
Active Euthanasia ◽  
Passive Euthanasia ◽  
Killing And Letting Die ◽  
Letting Die ◽  
Active And Passive Euthanasia

James Rachels’s distinction between killing and letting die maintains that there is morally no difference between killing a terminally ill patient and letting him/her die. Therefore, active and passive euthanasia dichotomy is a distinction without a difference. Hence, if passive euthanasia is allowed, active euthanasia should be permitted too. The paper demonstrated that the distinction between killing and letting die is: (1) irrelevant to euthanasia(2) extraneous to the medical profession, and (3) methodologically degressive. Furthermore, the paper demonstrated invalidity of the bare difference argument of Rachels based on the distinction  because of four reasons: (1) irrelevance to American Medical Association’s statement; (2) differences between the cases such as intentionality, causality, and agency; (3) straw man fallacy, (4) and weak analogy. Therefore, the paper concluded that relating the distinction between killings and letting die to bioethics and  euthanasia is unjustifiable.

Euthanasia and Related Practices Worldwide

Crisis ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 109-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J Kelleher † ◽  
Derek Chambers ◽  
Paul Corcoran ◽  
Helen S Keeley ◽  
Eileen Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
International Association ◽  
Active Euthanasia ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Passive Euthanasia ◽  
Medical Practitioners ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
International Importance ◽  
Controversial Area ◽  
Active And Passive Euthanasia

The present paper examines the occurrence of matters relating to the ending of life, including active euthanasia, which is, technically speaking, illegal worldwide. Interest in this most controversial area is drawn from many varied sources, from legal and medical practitioners to religious and moral ethicists. In some countries, public interest has been mobilized into organizations that attempt to influence legislation relating to euthanasia. Despite the obvious international importance of euthanasia, very little is known about the extent of its practice, whether passive or active, voluntary or involuntary. This examination is based on questionnaires completed by 49 national representatives of the International Association for Suicide Prevention (IASP), dealing with legal and religious aspects of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, as well as suicide. A dichotomy between the law and medical practices relating to the end of life was uncovered by the results of the survey. In 12 of the 49 countries active euthanasia is said to occur while a general acceptance of passive euthanasia was reported to be widespread. Clearly, definition is crucial in making the distinction between active and passive euthanasia; otherwise, the entire concept may become distorted, and legal acceptance may become more widespread with the effect of broadening the category of individuals to whom euthanasia becomes an available option. The “slippery slope” argument is briefly considered.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

Reactive Attitudes Revisited: A Modest Revision

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Reactive Attitudes

The essay offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” on which attributions of moral responsibility presuppose a practice of holding people morally responsible for their actions, and what explains the practice is our liability to such reactive attitudes as resentment and indignation. The interpretation is offered to correct a common misinterpretation of Strawson’s essay. On this common misinterpretation, attributions of moral responsibility are implicit in the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation, and consequently our liability to these attitudes cannot explain these attributions. The reason this is a misinterpretation of Strawson’s essay is that Strawson’s compatibilist solution to the free will problem requires that our liability to the reactive attitudes be conceptually prior to our attributions of moral responsibility.

scholarly journals God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Cheryl K. Chen
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Actual World ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
Horrendous Evil ◽  
Good And Evil ◽  
Free Will Defense ◽  
Better Than

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document