Understanding Environmentally Conscious Behaviour Through Environmental Identity

This paper argues that the strongly established connection between identity and consumer behaviour may not be necessarily applicable in examining environmentally conscious behaviour through an identity lens due to several other factors that may especially influence environmental identity formation; (1) the continuously evolving nature of environmental identity in the context of complexities (i.e., political debates, climate change science) of climate change; (2) the challenges of expressing inner connection with nature (i.e., instrumental value vs. intrinsic value); (3) the various cultural and symbolic meanings associated with environmentally conscious behaviour (i.e., functional benefits vs emotional benefits) and (4) different forms of behavioural practices (i.e., environmentally conscious behaviour vs. anti-consumption). Therefore, this paper recommends utilising insights and measurements unique to environmentally conscious behaviour as opposed to that of general consumer behaviour because the antecedents of the former, especially environmental identity projections can be multifaceted.

The Aesthetic Engagement Theory of Art

I introduce and explicate a new functionalist account of art, namely that something is an artwork iff the fulfillment of its function by a subject requires that the subject aesthetically engage it. This is the Aesthetic Engagement Theory of art. I show how the Aesthetic Engagement Theory outperforms salient rival theories in terms of extensional adequacy, non-arbitrariness, and ability to account for the distinctive value of art. I also give an account of what it is to aesthetically engage a work that relies on our agential capacity to treat an object as having non-instrumental value, even while the ultimate purpose for our engaging the object is to get something from it.

Democracy

Democracy is a term that is used to denote a variety of distinct objects and ideas. Democracy describes either a set of political institutions or an ideal of collective self-rule. Democracy can also be short for a normative principle of either legitimacy or justice. Finally, democracy might be used to denote an egalitarian attitude. These four uses of the term should be kept distinct and raises separate conceptual and normative issues. The value of democracy, whether democratic political institutions or democratic self-rule, is either instrumental, non-instrumental, or both. The non-instrumental value of democracy derives either from the alleged fairness of majority rule or from the value of the social relationships enabled by participation in democratic procedures. The instrumental value of democracy lends support from a growing body of empirical research. Yet, the claim that democracy has a positive causal effect on public goods is inconclusive with respect to the moral justification of democratic institutions. Normative reasons for democracy’s instrumental value must instead appeal to the fact that it contributes to equality, liberty, truth, or the realization of popular will. Democracy as a principle of either political legitimacy or justice is a normative view that evades concerns with the definition and value of democracy. Normative democracy is a claim about the conditions either for legitimacy or justice of either public authority or coercion. Debates in normative democracy are largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical concerns that inform studies of democracy elsewhere. The boundaries of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions is a question that applies to all four uses of democracy. The boundary question raises three distinct issues. The first is the extent of inclusion required among the members of the unit. The second is if membership in the unit is necessary for inclusion or if people that are not recognized as members are on certain conditions also entitled to participate. The third and final issue concerns the boundaries of the unit itself.

The Value of Truth

<p>People often want truth, and it often seems worth wanting. This has led many to claim that truth is valuable (VT). This essay argues that there are good reasons to reject VT. After dealing with preliminary issues, Chapter 1 discusses the instrumental value of truth. I argue that, though some instrumentally valuable beliefs are true, there is little reason to think that these beliefs are valuable because they are true. Chapter 2 and 3 are concerned with the claim that truth is intrinsically valuable (CVT). Chapter 2 examines a serious difficult facing CVT. This is the problem of trivial truths. Though this problem is often discussed, its power is rarely appreciated. I argue that the two most prominent responses to the problem fail. Chapter 3 poses a different question: Do people in fact consider truth to be valuable? A few notable exceptions aside, it is generally accepted that they do. Further, a number of arguments for CVT rest on this assumption. I argue it is very doubtful that people value truth intrinsically. If this is correct, the arguments for CVT that rest on this claim collapse.</p>

The Value of Truth

<p>People often want truth, and it often seems worth wanting. This has led many to claim that truth is valuable (VT). This essay argues that there are good reasons to reject VT. After dealing with preliminary issues, Chapter 1 discusses the instrumental value of truth. I argue that, though some instrumentally valuable beliefs are true, there is little reason to think that these beliefs are valuable because they are true. Chapter 2 and 3 are concerned with the claim that truth is intrinsically valuable (CVT). Chapter 2 examines a serious difficult facing CVT. This is the problem of trivial truths. Though this problem is often discussed, its power is rarely appreciated. I argue that the two most prominent responses to the problem fail. Chapter 3 poses a different question: Do people in fact consider truth to be valuable? A few notable exceptions aside, it is generally accepted that they do. Further, a number of arguments for CVT rest on this assumption. I argue it is very doubtful that people value truth intrinsically. If this is correct, the arguments for CVT that rest on this claim collapse.</p>

Poverty, Exploitation, Mere Things and Mere Means

I argue that, alongside the already well-established prohibition against treating persons as mere means, Kant’s Formula of Humanity requires a prohibition against treating persons as mere things. The former captures ethical violations due to someone’s (perceived) instrumental value, e.g. exploitation, the latter captures cases in which I mistreat others because they have no instrumental value to me. These are cases in which I am indifferent and complacent towards persons in need; forms of mistreatment frequently suffered by the world’s poorest. I explain why we need the category of treating others as mere things and what the prohibition against such treatment entails. Prohibitions against treating as mere means and as mere things are both essential for understanding the specific nature and extent of our duties to the world’s poorest.

Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking

We develop a theory of policymaking between an agent and an overseer, with a principal whose welfare is affected by agent-overseer interactions. The agent can increase the quality of policy outcomes through costly capacity investments. Oversight and agent bias jointly determine optimal agent capacity investments. We show that when oversight improves agent investment incentives the principal always benefits from an agent with biases opposite the overseer. Competing agent-overseer biases translate into higher quality policy outcomes than the principal could induce were she monitoring the agent. Effective oversight is necessary for these incentive effects. The results imply that political principals ought to consider the nature of the broader policymaking environment when appointing agents to make policy on their behalf and when designing managerial strategies aimed at motivating agents.

Gaya Kepemimpinan Kepala Madrasah dalam Meningkatkan Etika Manajemen di MAN 1 Kota Jambi

This study aims to describe the leadership style of madrasah heads in improving management ethics in MAN 1 Jambi City. This study uses qualitative methods. Data collection techniques using observations, interviews, and documentation. The results found that in improving management ethics in madrasah, the principal adhered to a democratic leadership style. The application of democratic leadership to establish management ethics goes well, resulting in positive values such as values of service orientation, integrity, commitment, discipline, cooperation and all actions based on ethical criteria, namely in terms of benefits, the fulfillment of rights, the justice side, and the maintenance side. There are three values of management ethics obtained, namely personal value as an ethical standard, terminal value (purpose); and instrumental value.