The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

Let's Play GOLF!

A central feature of the “free will defense” as developed by Alvin Plantinga is his response to the claim that God can create a world containing creatures with libertarian freedom that contains no moral evil. Plantinga’s response appeals to the notion of “morally significant freedom” according to which free creatures, in order to do moral good, must be capable of moral evil. In this paper, I argue, first, that morally significant freedom is not required for free creatures to do moral good and, second, that other recent attempts to necessitate a creaturely capability for evil likewise fail. The upshot of my paper is that the free will defense simply won’t work because it is possible and feasible for God to create a world containing libertarianly free creatures capable of moral good and yet containing no moral evil.

God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

The Value of Free Will

This chapter closely examines the free will theodicy and free will defense as responses to arguments from evil for atheism. It sets out three types of accounts of the nature of free will in the contemporary literature on agency and argues that only one of them is suitable for the free will theodicist’s (and defender’s) use. The chapter then takes up the question of whether or not God’s giving created beings free will, as characterized by that suitable sort of account, would make sense—that is, whether or not it would be worth the price. It argues that it would not, or at least that it is not unreasonable to refrain from believing that free will is worth the costs. If free will is not worth the costs, then it is unsuitable to serve as the central good that is alleged to provide a God-justifying reason for allowing evils in the world.

Evil and Free Will: Contemporary Free-Will Defense and Classical Theism

The article considers contemporary free will defences, proposed by A. Plantinga, R. Swinburne, according to which the existence of a world in which there is free will is something more valuable than the existence of a world in which there is no free will. It is shown that contemporary forms of free will defences share with atheistic arguments from evil an anthropomorphic model of God, in which God is thought as an individual among other individuals, although endowed with attributes such as omniscience and omnipotence to an excellent degree. It has also been shown that another important point of similarity between contemporary free will defences and atheistic arguments from evil is that both attempt to assess what our world would be like if created by such an individual. In contrast to atheistic arguments from evil, contemporary free will defences argue that divine omnipotence and omniscience are subject to some greater restrictions, as usually assumed, especially due to God's desire to give some of his creations the ability of free choice, which logically implies the possibility and even necessity of the existence of evil. It is demonstrated that classical theism does not share the anthropomorphic model of deity typical for many contemporary philosophers of religion. Classical theism rejects both the anthropomorphic model of deity and the unaccountability of free will to God as the supreme good. On the contrary, it assumes that free decision was initially an opportunity for the voluntary consent of man which had an innate aspiration towards God as his supreme good. Nevertheless, due to the creation of man out of nothing, this consent could not be automatic but implied forming a virtuous character, and man's transition from a state in which he was able not to sin, to a state in which he would be not able to sin.

Augustine on Evil

Augustine’s account of evil has influenced most later thinkers in the western tradition. He argues for three central theses: (a) evil is the lack of some positive feature that ought to be present, a “privation”; (b) moral evil comes about solely from the less-than-perfect free choices of rational beings; and (c) all suffering—which need not be the result of moral evil but perhaps of natural processes or events—is morally justified. As part of his defense of (b), Augustine states in full generality the problem of evil (namely, how can there be any genuine evil in a world presided over by an omnipotent and benevolent deity?), and articulates in reply the free will defense. The arguments Augustine offers in support of the free will defense, and in favor of (a)–(c), are set forth and their implications assessed. The upshot is a coherent account of evil that dominated the debates for many centuries to come.

Kritik terhadap Teologi Proses dan Pembelaan terhadap Pandangan “Greater Good” dalam Menanggapi Masalah Kejahatan

Selama berabad-abad, para teolog Kristen mencoba menanggapi pergumulan filosofis mengenai masalah kejahatan. Bapa-bapa Gereja dan tokoh-tokoh reformasi di masa lalu telah mencoba menanggapi permasalahan ini dengan argumen kebaikan yang lebih tinggi (greater good). Tetapi solusi-solusi semacam itu ditolak mentah-mentah setelah peristiwa Holocaust (Auschwitz), yang merupakan peristiwa kejahatan sangat dahsyat dan mengakibatkan penderitaan banyak sekali orang. Solusi tradisional dianggap sudah tidak relevan dalam menanggapi masalah kejahatan. Teologi proses kemudian mencoba menanggapi masalah ini dengan cara mereduksi atribut-atribut Allah. Tujuan karya tulis ini adalah untuk mengkritik pandangan kontemporer khususnya teologi proses dalam menanggapi masalah kejahatan, dan juga membela pandangan greater good sebagai solusi yang masih tetap dapat dipertahankan walaupun dengan beberapa penyesuaian. Kata-kata kunci: Teodisi, Soft-determinism, Kompatibilisme, Kedaulatan Allah, Masalah Kejahatan, Holocaust, Auschwitz, Teologi Proses, Pembelaan Kehendak Bebas, Teodisi Pembentukan Jiwa, Greater Good Theodicy, John Calvin, John Feinberg English: Throughout the ages Christian theologians have attempted to understand, from a philosophical vantagepoint, the problem of evil. The Church Fathers as well as theologians during the era of the Reformation have offered a solution that argues from the basis of the greater good. However, solutions of that nature seem to ring hollow when one considers the magnitude and scope of the Holocaust (Auschwitz). In light of that historical reality traditional solutions to the problem of evil seem inadequate. Process theology attempts to overcome the impasse by restricting the attributes of God. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate contemporary solutions to the problem of evil, especially process theology, as inadequate solutions. Further, to argue for the traditional positional argument of the greater good as offering a tenable solution. Keywords: Theodicy, Soft-determinism, Compatibilism, Sovereignty of God, Problem of Evil, Holocaust, Auschwitz, Process Theology, Free Will Defense, Soul-shaping Theodicy, Greater Good Theodicy, John Calvin, John Feinberg