Wittgenstein on Representation, Privileged Objects, and Private Languages

1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meredith Williams
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Private Language ◽  
The Real ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Private Language Argument

In this paper, I shall investigate Wittgenstein's ‘private language argument,’ that is, the argument to be found in Philosophical Investigations 243-315. Roughly, this argument is intended to show that a language knowable to one person and only that person is impossible; in other words, a ‘language’ which another person cannot understand isn't a language. Given the prolonged debate sparked by these passages, one must have good reason to bring it up again. I have: Wittgenstein's attack on private languages has regularly been misinterpreted. Moreover, it has been misinterpreted in a way that draws attention away from the real force of his arguments and so undercuts the philosophical significance of these passages.

The Real Private Language Argument

Philosophy ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 55 (211) ◽  
pp. 85-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart Candlish
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
The Real ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Private Language Argument

It verges on the platitudinous to say that Wittgenstein's own treatment of the question of a private language has been almost lost to view under mountains of commentary in the last twenty years—so much so, that no one with a concern for his own health would try to arrive at a verdict on the question by first mastering the available discussion. But a general acquaintance with the commentaries indicates that opinion on the matter can be roughly divided into two categories: that of the Old Orthodoxy (both defenders and attackers of Wittgenstein are included), most recently represented by Robert Fogelin in his book Wittgenstein; and that of what may be termed the New Guardians of the Wittgenstein Tradition, apparently based in Oxford and headed by Anthony Kenny, who in his book Wittgenstein has proposed a new account of the argument of Philosophical Investigations §§256–271. The important difference between the old and new orthodoxies will be considered later.

scholarly journals L. Wittgenstein on the Problem of Escape from Solipsism

2015 ◽  
pp. 58-61
Author(s):  
Angelo Loreti
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Private Language Argument

The article considers the concept of solipsism as a vital and philosophical impasse and analyzes Wittgenstein’s approach to this question in those paragraphs of the Philosophical Investigations that refer to “the private language argument”. The author shows that Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem leads to rejection of any philosophical and psychological thesis (of behaviorism, primarily), which could be compared to Gorgias’ negative ontology.

Private language argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stewart Candlish
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Private Language Argument ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Late Twentieth Century ◽  
Common Understanding

Ludwig Wittgenstein argued against the possibility of a private language in his 1953 book Philosophical Investigations, where the notion is outlined at §243: ‘The words of this language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language.’ The idea attacked is thus of a language in principle incomprehensible to more than one person because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others; cases such as personal codes where the lack of common understanding could be remedied are hence irrelevant. Wittgenstein’s attack, now known as the private language argument (although just one of many considerations he deploys on the topic), is important because the possibility of a private language is arguably an unformulated presupposition of standard theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy of mind from Descartes to much of the cognitive science of the late twentieth century. The essence of the argument is simple. It is that a language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established for its signs. But, because of the difficulty of Wittgenstein’s text and the tendency of philosophers to read into it their own concerns and assumptions, there has been extensive and fundamental disagreement over the details, significance and even intended conclusion of the argument. Some, thinking it obvious that sensations are private, have supposed that the argument is meant to show that we cannot talk about them; some that it commits Wittgenstein to behaviourism; some that the argument, self-defeatingly, condemns public discourse as well; some that its conclusion is that language is necessarily social in a strong sense, that is, not merely potentially but actually. Much of the secondary (especially the older) literature is devoted to disputes over these matters. An account of the argument by the influential American philosopher Saul Kripke has spurred a semi-autonomous discussion of it. But Kripke’s version involves significant departures from the original and relies on unargued assumptions of a kind Wittgenstein rejected in his own treatment of the topic.

King William and the Brecc Bennach in 1211: reliquary or holy banner?

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
National Museum ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Nature

In his Rhind Lectures of 1879 Joseph Anderson argued for identifying the Monymusk Reliquary, now in the National Museum of Scotland, with the Brecc Bennach, something whose custody was granted to Arbroath abbey by King William in 1211. In 2001 David H. Caldwell called this into question with good reason. Part of the argument relied on different interpretations of the word uexillum, ‘banner’, taken for a portable shrine by William Reeves and for a reliquary used as battle-standard by Anderson. It is argued here that none of this is relevant to the question. The Brecc Bennach is called a banner only as a guess at its long-forgotten nature in two late deeds. The word brecc, however, is used in the name of an extant reliquary, Brecc Máedóc, and Anderson was correct to think this provided a clue to the real nature of the Brecc Bennach. It was almost certainly a small portable reliquary, of unknown provenance but associated with St Columba. The king granted custody to the monks of Arbroath at a time when he was facing a rebellion in Ross, posing intriguing questions about his intentions towards this old Gaelic object of veneration.

Coetzee’s Quest for Reality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Crary
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Literature And Philosophy ◽  
Universal Truth

In this chapter, Alice Crary argues that a truly ‘realist’ work of literature might be one that, instead of conforming to familiar genre-specifications, attempts by other means to expose readers to the real—that is, to how things really are. Crary highlights Coetzee’s efforts to elicit what she calls ‘transformative thought’: a process that involves both delineating the progress of individual characters in their quests for reality, and, in formal terms, inviting readers to, for instance, imaginatively participate in such quests. With regard to The Childhood of Jesus, she highlights resonances between these features of Coetzee’s writing and Wittgenstein’s procedures in the Philosophical Investigations. In doing so, Crary brings out a respect in which literature and philosophy are complementary discourses: literature can deal in the sort of objective or universal truth that is philosophy’s touchstone, and philosophical discourse can have an essentially literary dimension.

Tracing the Rift: Heidegger, Hölderlin, and “The Origin of the Work of Art”

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 295-307
Author(s):  
Will McNeill ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central Concept ◽  
Work Of Art ◽  
The Real ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
To Come ◽  
Central Claim ◽  
Do So

Heidegger’s 1936 essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” is notoriously dense and difficult. In part this is because it appears to come almost from nowhere, given that Heidegger has relatively little to say about art in his earlier work. Yet the essay can only be adequately understood, I would argue, in concert with Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin from the same year, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing.” Without the Hölderlin essay, for instance, the central claim of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to the effect that all art is in essence poetizing, Dichtung, can hardly be appreciated in its philosophical significance without the discussions of both essence and poetizing that appear in the Hölderlin essay. This is true of other concepts also. The central concept of the rift (Riß)—the fissure or tear—that appears in “The Origin of the Work of Art” might readily be assumed to be adopted from Albrecht Dürer, whose use of the term Heidegger cites at a key point in the 1936 essay. Here, however, I argue that the real source of the concept for Heidegger is Hölderlin, and that the Riß is, moreover—quite literally—an inscription of originary, ekstatic temporality; that is, of temporality as the “origin” of Being and as the poetic or poetizing essence of art. I do so, first, by briefly considering Heidegger’s references to Dürer in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and other texts from the period, as well as his understanding of the Riß and of the tearing of the Riß in that essay and in its two earlier versions. I then turn to Heidegger’s 1936 Rome lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetizing,” in order to show the Hölderlinian origins of this concept for Heidegger.

Wittgenstein on Other Minds

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Kailashkanta Naik ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Private Language Argument ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Other Minds Problem ◽  
Problem Of Other Minds

When philosophy of mind goes into every detail in explaining about consciousness and its every aspect, the problem of other minds being its part is not spared. In such context going against the traditional way of giving justification Wittgenstein novel approach to other minds is remarkable and is close to the phenomenological understanding. The analysis of the sensation of pain as one of its important factors in solving the other minds problem is unique and it is this that proves how Wittgenstein dissolves the problem rather than giving a solution. This article focuses Wittgenstein’s two important factors: Private Language Argument and the concept of the sensation of pain in dissolving the issue. And in this I have made an attempt to show how his novelty in approaching this problem gains importance even today.

Kant on Fine Art, Genius and the Threat of Private Meaning

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviv Reiter
Keyword(s):  
Fine Art ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
Private Language Argument ◽  
Artistic Genius

AbstractWittgenstein’s private language argument claims that language and meaning generally are public. It also contends with our appreciation of artworks and reveals the deep connection in our minds between originality and the temptation to think of original meaning as private. This problematic connection of ideas is found in Kant’s theory of fine art. For Kant conceives of the capacity of artistic genius for imaginatively envisioning original content as prior to and independent of finding the artistic means of communicating this content to others. This raises the question of whether we can conceive of art as both original and meaningful without succumbing to privacy.

Can One Recognize Kinds of Private Objects?

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-227
Author(s):  
Charles E. Marks
Keyword(s):  
Private Language ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
The Individual

In § 243 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes a private language as follows: “The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” A private language is what each of us would need to talk of his own sensations if two philosophical theses were true: namely, (1) that only the person who has a sensation can know that he has it and what kind of sensation it is and (2) that since (1) is true, the names he applies to his own sensations can only be understood by him. If (1) and (2) were true, could a person classify and talk about his own sensations?

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