Parfit's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Law

Though consequentialist theories of political obligation have been widely criticized in recent years, a series of arguments presented by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, are now believed to have given this position new life.

The Decentering of Democracies

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Rosanvallon
Keyword(s):  
Great Majority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Majority Principle ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Democratic Elections

This introductory chapter considers the definitions of legitimacy in the context of democratic politics. Expressions such as the “great majority” or “vast majority” established the law of numbers, in contrast to the minority rule characteristic of despotic and aristocratic regimes. At first, it was the difference in the origins of power and the foundation of political obligation that was crucial. Later, the majority principle came to be recognized in a more narrowly procedural sense. The chapter traces this evolution within the history of democratic elections, positing a decentering of democracy as newer forms of political investment emerge, making democratic politics into something more than merely electing representatives.

1. Political obligation

2019 ◽  
pp. 6-24
Author(s):  
Keith Hyams
Keyword(s):  
Contract Theory ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism ◽  
Consent Theory ◽  
Do So

This chapter discusses the justifications for political obligation. The most important historical justification for political obligation is what is often called consent theory or contract theory. Consent theorists claim that we should obey the law because we have consented to do so. Meanwhile, the theorist H. L. A. Hart argues that if we accept a benefit, then it is only fair that we should reciprocate and give something back; if we enjoy the protection of police and armies, if we use roads, hospitals, schools, and other government-run services, then we should reciprocate by obeying the law. Other theorists argue that political obligation is something that we are bound by simply for being a member of a political community. If we cannot justify an obligation to obey the law, then we may have to adopt some form of philosophical anarchism — the view that we have no obligation to obey the law.

scholarly journals THE CONTENT-INDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO TEST IT

Legal Theory ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Simple Test ◽  
Independence Test ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
The Law

ABSTRACTOne of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its content-independence. We ought to do what the law commandsbecausethe law commands it, and not because of the law's content—i.e., the independent merits of the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I then develop a simple test—the “content-independence test”—which allows us to establish whether any candidate justification of the obligation to obey the law delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it.

Political Obligation

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos
Keyword(s):  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Additional Reason

There are good, prudential reasons to obey the law. The prospect of punishment, not to mention loss of reputation and social exclusion, is enough for most any citizen possessed of a suitably far-sighted self-interest to discharge his or her legal duties. But is there a moral obligation to do what the law requires, just because the law requires it? If the answer is yes and the mere illegality of an act renders its performance prima facie morally wrong, political obligation obtains. Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an action or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. But law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behavior and compelling acts and omissions that people tend to think of as morally discretionary. In such cases, the sole source of one’s moral duty to comply with the law is one’s political obligation.

Content-independence and natural-duty theories of political obligation

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Jiafeng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
State Authority ◽  
Argumentative Strategies ◽  
The Law ◽  
Unjust Threat

This paper contends that the requirement of content independence poses a pressing challenge to natural-duty theories of political obligation, for it is unclear why subjects of a state should not discharge the background natural duty in proper ways other than obeying the law. To demonstrate the force of this challenge, I examine and refute three argumentative strategies to achieve content independence represented in recent notable natural-duty theories: by appealing to the epistemic advantages of the state in discharging a natural duty, by claiming that one’s denial of state authority necessarily poses an unjust threat to other people, and by invoking the consideration of fairness (or impartiality) to preempt one’s discretion in discharging a natural duty. My criticisms, I believe, provide sufficient reasons for natural-duty theorists to take the requirement of content independence much more seriously.

The Principle of Fairness, Political Duties, and the Benefits Proviso Mistake

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Koltonski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law

Recent debate in the literature on political obligation about the principle of fairness rests on a mistake. Despite the widespread assumption to the contrary, a person can have a duty of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining some cooperative scheme even though that scheme does not represent a net benefit to her. Recognizing this mistake allows for a resolution of the stalemate between those who argue that the mere receipt of some public good from a scheme can generate a duty of fairness and those who argue that only some voluntary action of consent or acceptance of the good can generate such a duty. I defend a version of the principle of fairness that holds that it is the person’s reliance on a scheme for the provision of some product or service that generates duties of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining the scheme. And, on this version, the principle of fairness is politically significant: regardless of whether the citizen has a duty to obey the law, she will still have important political duties of fairness generated by her reliance on the various public goods provided by those society-wide cooperative schemes sustained by the sacrifices of her fellow citizens.

scholarly journals IN DEFENSE OF CONTENT-INDEPENDENCE

Legal Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.P. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Making

ABSTRACTDiscussions of political obligation and authority have focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of “content-independence” is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their container. I then show how the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is consistent with the fact that some laws must fail to bind due to their egregiously unjust content. Finally, I defend my understanding against challenges and show why it retains a place of special importance for questions about the law and political obligation. Content-independence highlights that it is some feature of the law or law-making process in general that is supposed to generate moral obligations for citizens, not the merits of particular laws.

Resistance in the Age of Trump

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice Delmas
Keyword(s):  
Hate Crimes ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Association

This chapter uses the book’s previous arguments to inquire into American citizens’ and officials’ present political obligations under President Donald Trump. Citizens are bound by the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association to resist the various injustices threatened or enacted by Trump’s administration, including by protesting, educating themselves, disobeying the law, intervening in cases of hate crimes, acting in solidarity, and donating cash and time to movements. The chapter then presents the recent debate over whether to serve under Trump, and argues that civil servants (officials and bureaucrats) have a political obligation to minimize damage from within, that is based on the duty of justice and the principle of fairness. Finally, it argues that resistance from within, given its anti-democratic appearance, should generate feelings of ambivalence among civil servants.

On Obligation and Civil Disobedience

Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 21-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
James F. Childress
Keyword(s):  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Ethics ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
The Law

In the recent burst of enthusiasm for endorsing violence and revolution, there has been too little reflection on why men ought to obey the law. Indeed, it seems that the charge of irrelevance can be levelled against anyone who insists on thinking seriously about traditionally important issues of political ethics such as political obligation, which, according to Isaiah Berlin, is "the most fundamental of all political questions." Fortunately, as these books show, not all philosophers and theologians have succumbed to the attraction of easy slogans.

Infinitesimals, Nations, and Persons

Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (04) ◽  
pp. 513-528
Author(s):  
Ian Rumfitt
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Infinitesimal Analysis ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle

AbstractI compare three sorts of case in which philosophers have argued that we cannot assert the Law of Excluded Middle for statements of identity. Adherents of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis deny that Excluded Middle holds for statements saying that an infinitesimal is identical with zero. Derek Parfit contended that, in certain sci-fi scenarios, the Law does not hold for some statements of personal identity. He also claimed that it fails for the statement ‘England in 1065 was the same nation as England in 1067’. I argue that none of these cases poses a serious threat to Excluded Middle. My analysis of the last example casts doubt on the principle of the Determinacy of Distinctness. While David Wiggins's ‘conceptualist realism’ provides a metaphysics which can dispense with that principle, it leaves no house-room for infinitesimals.

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