Political Obligation

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos
Keyword(s):  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Additional Reason

There are good, prudential reasons to obey the law. The prospect of punishment, not to mention loss of reputation and social exclusion, is enough for most any citizen possessed of a suitably far-sighted self-interest to discharge his or her legal duties. But is there a moral obligation to do what the law requires, just because the law requires it? If the answer is yes and the mere illegality of an act renders its performance prima facie morally wrong, political obligation obtains. Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an action or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. But law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behavior and compelling acts and omissions that people tend to think of as morally discretionary. In such cases, the sole source of one’s moral duty to comply with the law is one’s political obligation.

Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafeng Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Solid Ground ◽  
The Law ◽  
Democratic Procedure

The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen’s liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko’s account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument.

11. Why obey the law?

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-331
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

Do we have a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules simply because they are legal rules? What about obviously unfair or unjust laws? Or laws that impose unreasonable demands on us? The question of whether we have a duty to follow the demands of the law raises some fundamental issues regarding the nature of law and its moral claims. This chapter examines a number of possible reasons for obeying the law. It will examine the principal justifications for obedience: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude.

scholarly journals THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FINNIS AND RAZ

2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (152) ◽  
pp. 725
Author(s):  
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.

scholarly journals Utrata legitymizacji prawa według koncepcji Ronalda Dworkina

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-261
Author(s):  
Paweł Jabłoński
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Philosophy Of Law ◽  
The Law

The aim of the paper is to analyse the answer that Dworkin’s philosophy of law provides to the following question: what is the threshold of wickedness of the legal order that excuses citizens from the moral obligation to obey the law? This is not a problem of civil disobedience (which only contests a particular decision of making or applying the law), but a situation in which the whole political-legal system is the object of moral contestation. The task will be carried out in three steps. In the first one, I will outline Dworkin’s theory of political obligation, situating it in the broader framework of the debate on this obligation. In the second step, I will analyse one of the main elements of this theory, namely the legitimacy of the legal order. As a third step, I will draw attention to a rather — as it seems — surprising similarity between Dworkin’s argumentation and Radbruch’s formula.

Is Democracy Sufficient for Political Obligation?

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-442
Author(s):  
Kevin Walton
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Widespread Belief ◽  
The Law

This paper examines the apparently widespread belief that the democratic pedigree of a state implies a moral obligation to obey its laws. The analysis focuses on the work of Ronald Dworkin, who is, perhaps surprisingly, alone among theorists of democracy in claiming that those whom the law addresses are morally bound to obey it whenever it is democratic. From Dworkin’s expansive conception of democracy, political obligation follows. But democracy should not be construed so widely. Rather, it ought to be conceived more narrowly, such that, as other theorists concede, it cannot be more than part of a case for a moral obligation to obey the law. Hence, belief in the sufficiency of democracy for political obligation, notwithstanding its ostensible popularity, has yet to be justified.

11. Why obey the law?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Wacks
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Is there a moral duty to obey the law? Do we, in other words, have a moral obligation to comply with legal rules solely because they are legal rules? This question is particularly demanding when we are faced with laws that are obviously unjust or unfair, or those laws that make irrational or unreasonable demands on us. This subject has long vexed legal and moral philosophers; this chapter examines what possible reasons there are for obeying the law. The moral basis of obedience may spring from one or more of the following four principal sources: fair play, consent, the common good, and gratitude. Each is briefly discussed.

scholarly journals Plato’s Crito on Civil Disobedience and Political Obligations

2018 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kuniński
Keyword(s):  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Complex Relation ◽  
The Law

The present paper focuses on the complex relation between ethics andpolitics in Plato’s Crito. While the issue is presented from a contemporaryperspective, the problems of civil disobedience and politicalobligation are the present study’s primarily concern. The issue of civildisobedience concerns moral reasons for breaking the law, whereasthe concept of political obligation refers to a moral duty to obey the law.When disagreeing with the view that Socrates in the dialogue arguesfor an unconditional obedience to the state, the article builds on theApology. Subsequently, the similarities between the position of Socratesand that of H.D. Thoreau are investigated. Finally, the paper discussesthe concept of political obligation so as to show that the argumentin the Crito anticipates several modern theories. The modern controversiesthat this article covers are shown to play an important role in Plato’sdialogue, as they are the basis of Socrates’ political obligation.

New and not so new strategies in promoting integrity with particular reference to Africa

2018 ◽  
pp. 38-74
Author(s):  
Barry Rider
Keyword(s):  
World Economy ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Generational Change ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The World ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
Financial Intelligence ◽  
New Strategies

This article is focused on exploration not merely proposed developments in and refinements of the law and its administration, but the very significant role that financial intelligence can and should play in protecting our societies. It is the contention of the author that the intelligence community at large and in particular financial intelligence units have an important role to play in protecting our economies and ensuring confidence is maintained in our financial institutions and markets. In this article the author considers a number of issues pertinent to the advancement of integrity and in particular the interdiction of corruption to some degree from the perspective of Africa. The potential for Africa as a player in the world economy is enormous. So far, the ambiguous inheritance of rapacious empires and the turmoil of self-dealing elites in post-colonial times has successfully obscured and undermined this potential. Indeed, such has been the mismanagement, selfishness and importuning that many have grave doubts as to the ability of many states to achieve an ordered transition to what they could and should be. South Africa is perhaps the best example of a society that while avoiding the catastrophe that its recent past predicted, remains racked by corruption and mismanagement. That there is the will in many parts of the continent to further stability and security by addressing the cancer of corruption, the reality is that few have remained or been allowed to remain steadfast in their mission and all have been frustrated by political self-interest and lack of resources. The key might be education and inter-generational change as it has been in other parts of the world, but only an optimist would see this coming any time soon – there is too much vested interest inside and outside Africa in keeping things much as they are! The author focuses not so much on attempting to perfect the letter of the law, but rather on improving the ways in which we administer it.

Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law

Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-557 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Boardman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
The Law

scholarly journals The Danger for an Underestimation of Necessary Precautions for the Admissibility of Admissions in Section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-120
Author(s):  
’Mampolokeng ’Mathuso Mary-Elizabet Monyakane
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The South ◽  
Simple View ◽  
The Law ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
Law Of Evidence

AbstractThe Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.

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