The Principle of Fairness, Political Duties, and the Benefits Proviso Mistake

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Koltonski

Recent debate in the literature on political obligation about the principle of fairness rests on a mistake. Despite the widespread assumption to the contrary, a person can have a duty of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining some cooperative scheme even though that scheme does not represent a net benefit to her. Recognizing this mistake allows for a resolution of the stalemate between those who argue that the mere receipt of some public good from a scheme can generate a duty of fairness and those who argue that only some voluntary action of consent or acceptance of the good can generate such a duty. I defend a version of the principle of fairness that holds that it is the person’s reliance on a scheme for the provision of some product or service that generates duties of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining the scheme. And, on this version, the principle of fairness is politically significant: regardless of whether the citizen has a duty to obey the law, she will still have important political duties of fairness generated by her reliance on the various public goods provided by those society-wide cooperative schemes sustained by the sacrifices of her fellow citizens.

Author(s):  
Candice Delmas

This chapter uses the book’s previous arguments to inquire into American citizens’ and officials’ present political obligations under President Donald Trump. Citizens are bound by the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association to resist the various injustices threatened or enacted by Trump’s administration, including by protesting, educating themselves, disobeying the law, intervening in cases of hate crimes, acting in solidarity, and donating cash and time to movements. The chapter then presents the recent debate over whether to serve under Trump, and argues that civil servants (officials and bureaucrats) have a political obligation to minimize damage from within, that is based on the duty of justice and the principle of fairness. Finally, it argues that resistance from within, given its anti-democratic appearance, should generate feelings of ambivalence among civil servants.


2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.


Author(s):  
Masami Okino

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332098421
Author(s):  
Sam Whitt

This study considers how ethnic trust and minority status can impact the ability of ethnic groups to pursue cooperative public goods, focusing on groups with a history of conflict and lingering hostility. A public good experiment between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in postwar Kosovo reveals that subjects contribute far more to a mutually beneficial public good when they are part of an experimentally induced coethnic majority. However, when in the minority, subjects not only underinvest, but many actively divest entirely, privatizing the public good. Majority/minority status also has wide-ranging implications for how individuals relate to real-world public goods and the institutions of government that provide them. Compared to majority Albanians, survey data indicate how minority Serbs in Kosovo express greater safety and security concerns, feel more politically, socially, and economically excluded, are more dissatisfied with civil liberties and human rights protections, and are less likely to participate politically or pay taxes to support public goods. Conflict-related victimization and distrust of out-groups are strong predictors of these minority group attitudes and behaviors. This suggests a mechanism for how conflict amplifies out-group distrust, increasing parochial bias in public good commitments, especially among minorities who are wary of exploitation at the hands of an out-group majority. To restore trust, this study finds that institutional trust and intergroup contact are important to bridging ethnic divides that inhibit public good cooperation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (103) ◽  
pp. 20141203 ◽  
Author(s):  
The Anh Han ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira ◽  
Tom Lenaerts

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-172
Author(s):  
Gabriele Schneider

Foundations, as permanent funds established by a certain legal act, can serve manifold purposes, but often pursue charitable goals. As such, they play an important role for the public good. Therefore, states always had an interest in fostering foundations by providing a pertinent legal framework. In Austria, this topic has not yet been the focus of scholarship. Through this study some light is shed on the implementation of the law on foundations in the Habsburg Monarchy. It focuses on the role of the state and its legal system regarding the regulation and supervision of foundations from 1750 to 1918. This period is characterized by the sovereigns’ endeavor to regulate the position of foundations via extensive legislation. In particular, a system of oversight for foundations was created in order to guarantee the attainment of their charitable goals. In fact, this system prevailed until the end of the 20thcentury.


1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald E. Rice ◽  
Marni Heinz ◽  
Ward van Zoonen

Purpose This study aims to take a public goods approach to understand relationships between collecting and contributing knowledge to an online knowledge sharing portal (KSP), mental model processing and outcomes at the individual and collective levels. Design/methodology/approach This study reports on a survey (N = 602) among tax professionals, examining the perceived individual and collective benefits and costs associated with collecting and contributing knowledge. Hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling. Findings Collecting and contributing knowledge led to considerable mental model processing of the knowledge. That in turn significantly influenced (primarily) individual and (some) collective costs and benefits. Results varied by the kinds of knowledge sharing. Whether directly from knowledge sharing, or mediated through mental modeling, the perceived costs and benefits may be internalized as an individual good rather than being interpreted at the collective level as a public good. Research limitations/implications The study is situated in the early stages of a wiki-type online KSP. A focus on the learning potential of the system could serve to draw in new users and contributors, heightening perceptions of the public goods dimension of a KSP. Practical implications A focus on the learning potential of the system could serve to draw in new users, and thus the number of subsequent contributors, heightening perceptions of the collective, public goods dimension of a KSP. Originality/value This study explores how knowledge sharing and mental model processing are directly and indirectly associated with individual and collective costs and benefits. As online knowledge sharing is both an individual and public good, costs and benefits must be considered from both perspectives.


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