Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

In ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Harry Frankfurt introduces a scenario aimed at showing that the having of alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility. According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she could have done otherwise; Frankfurt thinks his scenario shows that PAP is, in fact, false. Frankfurt also thinks that the denial of PAP gives credence to compatibilism, the thesis that an agent could both be causally determined in all her actions and yet be morally responsible. Since its introduction, Frankfurt's original example has generated a voluminous literature, including a plethora of other, more complicated, Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs).

scholarly journals Blockage Cases: No Case against PAP

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (104) ◽  
pp. 109-120
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya Espí
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
Plausible Condition

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples ("Frankfurt cases") in which a counterfactual, and unactivated, device ensures that the agent will decide and do what she actually decides and does on her own, if she shows some sign that she is going to decide and do something else. Problems with these cases have led some thinkers to design examples in which the counterfactual factor is replaced by a device that actually blocks alternative possibilities. I argue that, even if these cases did not illicitly assume determinism, they are not successful against PAP anyway, for they violate a plausible condition on moral responsibility that Fischer has called "reasons-responsiveness".

scholarly journals Investigation of Frankfurt's Argument on Moral Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Tavakkol Koohi Giglou ◽  
Javad Danesh ◽  
Habib Asadi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Famous Paper ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

The common thought of Christian and Moslem philosophers considers moral responsibility of a person as dependent on his or her ability to choose from several options. However, Harry Frankfurt in his famous paper " alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" challenges freedom condition for moral responsibility with implicit reasons and makes use of several examples to show that it is completely possible for a person to be considered as morally responsible despite failure to access any kind of alternate possible. However, there are two reasons presented by Frankfurt that contrary to his claims show that presence of alternate possibilities or at least imagination for presence of alternatives is the base for responsibility or difficulty of moralactor and if sometimes anactor is regarded as responsible despite absence of alternate possible, this is resulted from his or her "ignorance" of the matter and also the impact of his "intention" in doing action. One of the main defects of theories which deal with moral responsibility conditions is ignoring the intention and purpose of moralactor. This is while ethics domain includes internal actions like intention and will of moral actor as well as apparent actions.

ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Michael Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Flicker Of Freedom

Abstract:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

scholarly journals Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 131-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Rychter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

Agnosticism about Moral Responsibility

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Byrd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Mark Ravizza ◽  
Source Incompatibilism

Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 and 2002; van Inwagen 1983: 182-8; and Zagzebski 2000). Incompatibilists of this stripe are generally motivated by the concern that, if determinism is true, we are not genuine or ultimate sources of our actions and, hence, we are not responsible for what we do. Following Michael McKenna (2001), I shall call this view source incompatibilism. While the source incompatibilist's concern is rather vague as stated, it has given rise to a powerful argument against any attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have labeled this the Direct Argument, as it avoids the detour of alternative possibilities.

Nietzsche’s Theory of Agency

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-146
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Derk Pereboom ◽  
Gary Watson ◽  
The Will ◽  
And Control ◽  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Nietzsche’s repudiation of free will and moral responsibility is documented throughout his corpus, and his arguments for this conclusion—arguments from his distinctive kind of fatalism, his skepticism about the causal efficacy of the will, and his particular brand of epiphenomenalism about the conscious mental states crucial to deliberation—are shown to undermine both compatibilist and incompatibilist views about free will and moral responsibility by engaging the views of many contemporary philosophers working on these topics, including Harry Frankfurt, Galen Strawson, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, Gary Watson, and others. In particular, the chapter argues that both “alternate possibilities” and “control” views of free will are vulnerable to Nietzsche’s critique. Some empirical evidence is adduced in support of Nietzsche’s view.

The Relevance of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions

2020 ◽  
pp. 232-274
Author(s):  
Pascale Willemsen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Many philosophers have argued that alternative possibilities are required for an agent’s moral responsibility for the consequences of omitting an action. In contrast, it is argued that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility for the consequences of performing an action. Thus, while an agent can be morally responsible for an action she could not have avoided, an agent is never morally responsible for omitting an action she could not have performed. Call this the Action/Omission Asymmetry Thesis. This chapter describes various strategies to challenge the Action/Omission Asymmetry Thesis and identifies the predictions those strategies make about the conditions under which an agent will be held morally responsible for an unavoidable action or omission. Studies reported in the chapter indicate that whether there is an Action/Omission Asymmetry strongly depends, first, on the type of moral judgment considered relevant for the Action/Omission Asymmetry Thesis, and, second, the scale used to test the folk’s intuition.

scholarly journals O princípio das possibilidades alternativas

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-249
Author(s):  
Tania Schneider Da Fonseca
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Com o seu artigo de 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt mudou o curso do debate sobre o problema da vontade livre. Ele forneceu exemplos hipotéticos, por meio de experimentos de pensamento, de agentes que, conforme ele argumentou, embora não pudessem ter agido de outro modo, ainda assim seriam moralmente responsáveis pelas suas ações. O artigo de Frankfurt entusiasmou muitos filósofos, destacadamente John Fischer, a repensar o problema da responsabilidade moral. Para Fischer, Frankfurt teria mostrado que o debate não diz mais respeito ao problema de demonstrar a compatibilidade entre liberdade e determinismo, mas, sim, à questão da compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo.

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