scholarly journals Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 131-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Rychter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

Compatibilist Alternatives

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keim Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Source Theory

This paper is a defense of traditional compatibilism. Traditional compatibilism is, roughly, the view that (a) free will is essential to moral responsibility, (b) free will requires alternative possibilities of action, or alternatives for short, and (c) moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Traditional compatibilism is a version of the traditional theory of free will. According to the traditional theory, a person S performed an action a freely only if S could have done otherwise, that is, only if S had alternatives. The traditional theory is often contrasted with the source theory: S performed a freely only if S was the source of a (McKenna 2001; Pereboom 2003). One may adopt a combined view of free will that sanctions both the traditional and source theories (Kane 1996, 72-3; van Inwagen 1983). As I use the terms ‘source theorist’ and ‘traditional theorist,’ the former refers to folks who accept the source theory and reject the traditional theory; the latter refers to folks who accept the traditional theory whether or not they accept the source theory.

Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Buddhist Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Early Buddhism

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

ROBUST FLICKERS OF FREEDOM

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Michael Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Flicker Of Freedom

Abstract:This essay advances a version of the flicker of freedom defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) and shows that it is invulnerable to the major objections facing other versions of this defense. Proponents of the flicker defense argue that Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine PAP because agents in these cases continue to possess alternative possibilities. Critics of the flicker strategy contend that the alternatives that remain open to agents in these cases are unable to rebuff Frankfurt-style attack on the grounds that they are insufficiently robust (that is, morally significant in a way that could ground ascriptions of moral responsibility). Once we see that omissions are capable of constituting robust alternatives, even when they are not intentional, it becomes clear that agents in these cases do indeed possess robust alternative possibilities—alternatives that are ineliminable from cases of this sort. The upshot is that Frankfurt-style cases are theoretically incapable of providing us with good grounds for rejecting PAP.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

Agnosticism about Moral Responsibility

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Byrd
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Direct Argument ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Mark Ravizza ◽  
Source Incompatibilism

Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 and 2002; van Inwagen 1983: 182-8; and Zagzebski 2000). Incompatibilists of this stripe are generally motivated by the concern that, if determinism is true, we are not genuine or ultimate sources of our actions and, hence, we are not responsible for what we do. Following Michael McKenna (2001), I shall call this view source incompatibilism. While the source incompatibilist's concern is rather vague as stated, it has given rise to a powerful argument against any attempt to reconcile moral responsibility and determinism. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have labeled this the Direct Argument, as it avoids the detour of alternative possibilities.

scholarly journals Blockage Cases: No Case against PAP

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (104) ◽  
pp. 109-120
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya Espí
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
Plausible Condition

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for something she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt held that PAP was false on the basis of examples ("Frankfurt cases") in which a counterfactual, and unactivated, device ensures that the agent will decide and do what she actually decides and does on her own, if she shows some sign that she is going to decide and do something else. Problems with these cases have led some thinkers to design examples in which the counterfactual factor is replaced by a device that actually blocks alternative possibilities. I argue that, even if these cases did not illicitly assume determinism, they are not successful against PAP anyway, for they violate a plausible condition on moral responsibility that Fischer has called "reasons-responsiveness".

The Freedom Required for Moral Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Martin Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Actual Sequence

Some philosophers argue that we do not need freedom to do otherwise or access to alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. These philosophers are actual-sequence theorists of moral responsibility who are motivated by Frankfurt cases, in which there is pre-emptive overdetermination. They contend that in these cases the agent is morally responsible but does not have freedom to do otherwise or access to alternative possibilities. Others have rejected the actual-sequence approach. They contend that the sort of freedom to do otherwise required for moral responsibility is indeed present in the Frankfurt cases. This essay explores the significance of the debate between these two camps. Are the two views importantly different or mere notational variants of each other? I examine these questions with attention to Terry Irwin’s discussion of Aristotle on responsibility.

Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Paul Bernier
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Buddhist Philosophy ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Early Buddhism

Free will and determinism have recently attracted the attention of Buddhist scholars who have defended conflicting views on this issue. I argue that there is no reason to think that this problem cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy, since there are two senses of ‘free will’ that are compatible with the doctrine of non-self. I propose a reconstruction of a problem of free will and determinism in Early Buddhism, given a) the assumption that Buddhist causation entails universal causal determinism, and b) a crucial passage (A I 173–175) suggesting that Early Buddhism is committed to the principle of alternative possibilities which is arguably incompatible with a determinist interpretation of causation. This passage suggests that Early Buddhism must leave room for a robust, incompatibilist form of free will, and that a conception of indeterminist free will in the spirit of Robert Kane’s theory allows us to make sense of that notion.

Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Timpe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Principle Of Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

In ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,’ Harry Frankfurt introduces a scenario aimed at showing that the having of alternative possibilities is not required for moral responsibility. According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she could have done otherwise; Frankfurt thinks his scenario shows that PAP is, in fact, false. Frankfurt also thinks that the denial of PAP gives credence to compatibilism, the thesis that an agent could both be causally determined in all her actions and yet be morally responsible. Since its introduction, Frankfurt's original example has generated a voluminous literature, including a plethora of other, more complicated, Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs).

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