Doing something intentionally and knowing that you are doing it

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
Knowing That ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Attitudes

A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.

scholarly journals Reasoning and Self-Knowledge

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55
Author(s):  
Martin F. Fricke
Keyword(s):  
First Order ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge

What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections.

Time After Augustine

1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Wetzel
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Experience ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Experience Of Time ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Metaphysics Of Time

The metaphysics of time, though almost always diverting, is rarely discomforting. I can wonder what time is, come up only with conundrums, and yet still feel intimately acquainted with time by way of my mundane experience. Familiarity in this case breeds contempt of metaphysics. If I were to pose the question of time as Augustine posed it, however, I would find no refuge in time's familiarity, for time's familiarity is part of what has come into question. My ordinary experience of time may not be of time after all. Facing such a possibility is discomforting, but it may also be the beginning of wisdom. In Augustine's hands, metaphysical questions turn back upon their owners. What I ask of time I ask of myself. The wisdom comes, if it comes at all, in coming to understand the demand knowledge of the world has made upon my self-knowledge. There is nothing worth knowing that does not in some way transform the knower. Augustine hints at the transformation called for in the knowledge of time. It is disturbingly profound.

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