The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience

According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.

Linguaconflictological Research of Internet Appeal

The present research features the genre of internet appeal as a dialogic conflict process. The paper focuses on the internet appeal as an element of conflict communication and a form of open dialogue between the state and society. The linguaconflictological approach was determined by communication strategies and intentional attitudes of the sender and recipient of the internet appeal. The authors proved that the internet appeal is a special sub-genre of the complaint and explained how conflict manifests itself in this genre. The analysis of strategies and tactics revealed conceptual ideas of internet users who applied for help to officials institutions. The empirical basis of research was obtained from the internet page of the Governor of Kemerovo region. The analysis showed the effect of various factors on speech strategies and tactics and revealed communicative intentions. The internet appeal is characterized by a set of specific strategies and tactics of conflict communication, determined by the gap between the intentional attitudes of the sender and the recipient.

Doing something intentionally and knowing that you are doing it

A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.

Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint

ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.

,In den Zeiten, wo das Wünschen noch geholfen hat’

There is a widely accepted view in action theory (most prominently defended by Donald Davidson) according to which (1) actions are events, (2) reasons are intentional attitudes of the agent (pairs of beliefs and desires), and (3) acting for a reason entails that the reason rationalizes as well as causes the action. In the first part of my contribution I list seventeen difficulties for this standard account; in the second part I give an outline of how a more plausible conception of reasons and actions could look like. According to this conception, which is based on Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of a mechanistic understanding of psychological concepts, agency is due to a special kind of disposition of the agent, namely the disposition to behave as if the agent were permanently deliberating about what to do. The conception has surprising consequences for the ontological status of intentional attitudes and actions and for the relationship between action and responsibility.