Resubsumption: A Possible Mechanism for Conceptual Change and Belief Revision

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
STELLAN OHLSSON
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Belief Revision

scholarly journals Conceptual Learning and Local Incommensurability: A Dynamic Logic Approach

Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corina Strößner
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Conceptual Learning ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Logical Reconstruction ◽  
Logical Study ◽  
Logic Approach

AbstractIn recent decades, the logical study of rational belief dynamics has played an increasingly important role in philosophy. However, the dynamics of concepts such as conceptual learning received comparatively little attention within this debate. This is problematic insofar as the occurrence of conceptual change (especially in the sciences) has been an influential argument against a merely logical analysis of beliefs. Especially Kuhn’s ideas about the incommensurability, i.e., untranslatability, of succeeding theories seem to stand in the way of logical reconstruction. This paper investigates conceptual change as model-changing operations similar to belief revision and relates it to the notion of incommensurability. I consider several versions of conceptual change and discuss their influences on the expressive power, translatability and the potential arising of incommensurability. The paper concludes with a discussion of animal taxonomy in Aristotle’s and Linnaeus’s work.

scholarly journals Taking Up Thagard’s Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sena Bozdag ◽  
Matteo De Benedetto
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Conceptual Systems ◽  
Traditional Belief ◽  
Conceptual Structures

AbstractThagard (1992) presented a framework for conceptual change in science based on conceptual systems. Thagard challenged belief revision theorists, claiming that traditional belief-revision systems are able to model only the two most conservative types of changes in his framework, but not the more radical ones. The main aim of this work is to take up Thagard’s challenge, presenting a belief-revision-like system able to mirror radical types of conceptual change. We will do that with a conceptual revision system, i.e. a belief-revision-like system that takes conceptual structures as units of revisions. We will show how our conceptual revision and contraction operations satisfy analogous of the AGM postulates at the conceptual level and are able to mimic Thagard’s radical types of conceptual change.

scholarly journals Predicate Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1183
Author(s):  
Corina Strößner
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Expressive Power

AbstractLike belief revision, conceptual change has rational aspects. The paper discusses this for predicate change. We determine the meaning of predicates by a set of imaginable instances, i.e., conceptually consistent entities that fall under the predicate. Predicate change is then an alteration of which possible entities are instances of a concept. The recent exclusion of Pluto from the category of planets is an example of such a predicate change. In order to discuss predicate change, we define a monadic predicate logic with three different kinds of lawful belief: analytic laws, which hold for all possible instances; doxastic laws, which hold for the most plausible instances; and typicality laws, which hold for typical instances. We introduce predicate changing operations that alter the analytic laws of the language and show that the expressive power is not affected by the predicate change. One can translate the new laws into old laws and vice versa. Moreover, we discuss rational restrictions of predicate change. These limit its possible influence on doxastic and typicality laws. Based on the results, we argue that predicate change can be quite conservative and sometimes even hardly recognisable.

Conceptual Change and Attitude Change: A Dynamic Interplay

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Heddy ◽  
Gale M. Sinatra ◽  
Robert Danielson ◽  
Jesse Graham
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Attitude Change ◽  
Dynamic Interplay

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

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