Monuments and Memory: Immortalizing Count M. N. Muraviev in Vilna, 1898

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-564
Author(s):  
Theodore R. Weeks

Ernest Renan argued over a century ago that belonging to a nation entails forgetting just as much as it required remembering past events. Certainly this is the case in East Central Europe, where not infrequently different nationalities create out of a single historical event utterly opposing historical memories. In the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, one historical event that has been variously interpreted by different nationalities is the Insurrection of 1863. To simplify somewhat, prerevolutionary Russian historians generally interpreted this key event as a mutiny against the established legal order—the term miatezh (mutiny) was always used in such accounts—while the Poles interpreted the uprising as perhaps naive and foolish, but in any case a noble attempt to regain rights usurped by the Russian occupiers. With such a sharply opposed memory of the uprising as a whole, it comes as no surprise that the figure who did the most to crush the insurrection in the Northwest (Lithuanian and Belarusian) provinces, Count M. N. Muraviev, should also be a controversial figure, praised by conservative Russians and demonized by Poles, Lithuanians, and liberals of all nationalities.

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Uwe Müller

Summary The article analyzes the position and the positioning strategy of East Central Europe in the so-called “first globalization (1850-1914)”. The focus is on foreign trade and the transfer of the two most important production factors, i.e. capital and labor. East Central Europe included in this period the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Kingdom of Poland as a part of the Russian Empire, and the eastern provinces of the Kingdom of Prussia which were from 1871 onwards part of the German Reich. The article combines the theories and methods of economic history and transnational history. It sees itself as a contribution to a trans-regional history of East Central Europe by analyzing first the main “flows” and then the influence of “controls”. The article analyzes to what extent and in what way East Central Europe was involved in the globalization processes of the late 19th century. It discusses whether East Central Europe was only the object of global developments or even shaped them. In this context it asks about the role of the empires (Habsburg monarchy, German Reich, Russia) for the position of East Central European economies in the world economy. It shows that the economic elites in the centers but also on the edges of the empires developed different strategies for how to respond to the challenges of globalization.


Author(s):  
Jacek Wieclawski

This article discusses the problems of the sub-regional cooperation in East-Central Europe. It formulates the general conclusions and examines the specific case of the Visegrad Group as the most advanced example of this cooperation. The article identifies the integrating and disintegrating tendencies that have so far accompanied the sub-regional dialogue in East-Central Europe. Yet it claims that the disintegrating impulses prevail over the integrating impulses. EastCentral Europe remains diversified and it has not developed a single platform of the sub-regional dialogue. The common experience of the communist period gives way to the growing difference of the sub-regional interests and the ability of the East-Central European members to coordinate their positions in the European Union is limited. The Visegrad Group is no exception in this regard despite its rich agenda of social and cultural contacts. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict confirms a deep divergence of interests among the Visegrad states that seems more important for the future of the Visegrad cooperation than the recent attempts to mark the Visegrad unity in the European refugee crisis. Finally, the Ukrainian crisis and the strengthening of the NATO’s “Eastern flank” may contribute to some new ideas of the sub-regional cooperation in East-Central Europe, to include the Polish-Baltic rapprochement or the closer dialogue between Poland and Romania. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v10i1.251  


Author(s):  
Balázs Trencsényi ◽  
Michal Kopeček ◽  
Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič ◽  
Maria Falina ◽  
Mónika Baár ◽  
...  

The interwar radicalization of politics in East Central Europe was linked to the proliferation of a discourse of crisis. Symptoms of crisis could be localized in certain social groups, institutions, and social relations, such as the generational cleavage. Since the topos of crisis was not bound to any particular ideology, the very same discourse was used by liberal and leftist intellectuals as well. Nevertheless, the most plausible ideological framework offering a way out of the crisis seemed to be the “conservative revolution,” promising to restore the continuity of traditions that had been interrupted by the breakthrough of modernity. This led to the proliferation of “national metaphysics,” defining the specificity of the respective nation with ontological categories. Another face of this “conservative revolution” was the politicization of religion, linked to the renewed interest in myth and popular religiosity. At the same time, there was also a conservative anti-totalitarian stance and, in a few cases, a left-wing reorientation of certain religious subcultures.


Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein

One reason governments have protected their banks from foreign ownership is that they feared foreign-owned banks would “cut and run”—i.e. abandon their host markets—in a financial crisis. An unexpected finding of this chapter, however, is that while foreign banks’ commitments to host markets have indeed been fleeting in crises, those commitments were weakest when the relationship between foreign banks and host markets was not characterized by ownership. Thus it was foreign ownership through a “second home market” model and bank subsidiaries during the acute phase of the US financial crisis (2008–9) that saved East Central Europe from economic catastrophe. In Western Europe, meanwhile, where foreign bank ownership levels were low but cross-border lending was significant, bank lending retreated behind national borders. This chapter also rejects the argument that the Vienna Initiative, a voluntary bank rollover agreement, compelled foreign-owned banks to maintain their exposures in East Central Europe.


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