Product green degree, service free-riding, strategic price difference in a dual-channel supply chain based on dynamic game

Optimization ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-42
Author(s):  
Yu Liang ◽  
Xiaochen Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Price Difference ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

EVOLUTION OF TRUST IN A DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN CONSIDERING RECIPROCAL ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (06n07) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
KUIRAN SHI ◽  
HUJIE MA
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Learning Abilities ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Output Ratio ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In order to alleviate the conflict between the channels in dual-channel supply chain, the altruism tendency and trust input are important for strengthening the cooperation between the channels. We view the dual-channel supply chain as a nonlinear system that consists of co-competition, learning decision and dynamic game between direct channels and retail channels. Then, we develop learning dynamics and evolutionary game model to analyze the channels’ altruism behavior and the factors that influence trust input. We find that the evolutionary direction of altruistic behavior is determined by the sensitiveness and the learning abilities of both members of supply chains. The trust input decision of both channels is highly related to the output ratio of high-level trust input, only if the input–output ratio is ideal for both game parties, the system may come to an evolutionary stable equilibrium of high trust input. If the trust input of the two sides is unilateral, then one side chooses high trust input, while the other side chooses low trust input. In this case, even the input–output ratio is high, it will not be evolutionary stable. The profit both sides earned from the low-trust cooperation is the basic for further trust input, the increased free ride income, trust input risk and the trust evaluation cost will affect the enthusiasm of trust input for the dual-channel supply chain members. To promote high trust input in dual-channel supply chain, a certain amount of compensation should be negotiated in the contract in order to improve the performance of the supply chain.

Pareto Improvement Strategy for Service-Based Free-Riding in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (06) ◽  
pp. 1450050 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Dan ◽  
Can Liu ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Xumei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Relative Size ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays are increasingly adopting a dual-channel strategy to sell their products. In this paper, we present an analytical framework in a single-channel supply chain and a dual-channel supply chain, respectively. We compare the optimal service levels under different scenarios to investigate the impacts of bidirectional free-riding and service competition on members' decisions. In order to realize system optimization, we propose contracts to coordinate the decentralized supply chain under different cases. We find that when a new channel is added, the retailer will always increase his service level to compete with the manufacturer, while the manufacturer needs to take the relationship with the retailer into consideration and decides whether to increase or decrease her service level. We also find that the contracts for different cases can make the optimal solutions the same as those under the centralized scenario by adjusting service levels based on the relative size of competition effect and spillover effect. Finally, we conduct numerical examples to verify the existence of Pareto improvement intervals and derive some managerial insights.

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