Animal personalities in a competitive game theory context

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-281
Author(s):  
David Costantini
Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 383-399
Author(s):  
Sungwook Kim

Computer network bandwidth can be viewed as a limited resource. The users on the network compete for that resource. Their competition can be simulated using game theory models. No centralized regulation of network usage is possible because of the diverse ownership of network resources. Therefore, the problem is of ensuring the fair sharing of network resources. If a centralized system could be developed which would govern the use of the shared resources, each user would get an assigned network usage time or bandwidth, thereby limiting each person's usage of network resources to his or her fair share. As of yet, however, such a system remains an impossibility, making the situation of sharing network resources a competitive game between the users of the network and decreasing everyone's utility. This chapter explores this competitive game.


Author(s):  
Igor Bimbiloski ◽  
Valentin Rakovic ◽  
Anis Sefidanoski ◽  
Aleksandar Risteski
Keyword(s):  

Computer network bandwidth can be viewed as a limited resource. The users on the network compete for that resource. Their competition can be simulated using game theory models. No centralized regulation of network usage is possible because of the diverse ownership of network resources. Therefore, the problem is of ensuring the fair sharing of network resources. If a centralized system could be developed which would govern the use of the shared resources, each user would get an assigned network usage time or bandwidth, thereby limiting each person's usage of network resources to his or her fair share. As of yet, however, such a system remains an impossibility, making the situation of sharing network resources a competitive game between the users of the network and decreasing everyone's utility. This chapter explores this competitive game.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Masoud Rabbani ◽  
Sina Keyhanian ◽  
Maryam Ghazanfari ◽  
Marzieh Baseri ◽  
Moeen Sammak Jalali

Higher inflation rate and subsequently, higher prices make customers consider other options except purchasing products to meet their requirements. Therefore, demand for leasing is rising meaningfully in such conditions. Companies producing costly products are considering leasing as a new approach for getting higher profit. In this study, the authors assume the case of sale and leasing departments as two different parts in a company. There are strategies assumed for both sections of a company, which make multiple feature packages. The objective is to define the best strategy for both departments in a competitive game theory model considering customers' behavior towards different offered packages. A heavy equipment company with sale and leasing department as a case study has been studied, and the Nash equilibrium is selected based on game theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannike Dyb Oksavik ◽  
Marit Solbjør ◽  
Ralf Kirchhoff ◽  
Maren Kristine Raknes Sogstad

Abstract Background Active patients lie at the heart of integrated care. Although interventions to increase the participation of older patients in care planning are being implemented in several countries, there is a lack of knowledge about the interactions involved and how they are experienced by older patients with multimorbidity. We explore this issue in the context of care-planning meetings within Norwegian municipal health services. Methods This qualitative study drew on direct observations of ten care-planning meetings and an interview with each patient right after the meeting. Following a stepwise-deductive induction approach, the analysis began inductively and then considered the interactions through the lens of game theory. Results The care-planning interactions were influenced by uncertainty about the course of the disease and how to plan service delivery. In terms derived from game theory, the imaginary and unpredictable player ‘Nature’ generated uncertainty in the ‘game’ of care planning. The ‘players’ assessed this uncertainty differently, leading to three patterns of game. 1) In the ‘game of chance’, patients viewed future events as random and uncontrollable; they felt outmatched by the opponent Nature and became passive in their decision-making. 2) In the ‘competitive game’, participants positioned themselves on two opposing sides, one side perceiving Nature as a significant threat and the other assigning it little importance. The two sides negotiated about how to accommodate uncertainty, and the level of patient participation varied. 3) In the ‘coordination game’, all participants were aligned, either in viewing themselves as teammates against Nature or in ascribing little importance to it. The level of patient participation was high. Conclusions In care planning meetings, the level of patient participation may partly be associated with how the various actors appraise and respond to uncertainty. Dialogue on uncertainty in care-planning interventions could help to increase patient participation.


Author(s):  
Ein-Ya Gura ◽  
Michael Maschler
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Zhu Han ◽  
Dusit Niyato ◽  
Walid Saad ◽  
Tamer Basar ◽  
Are Hjorungnes

1967 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 360-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
BERNHARDT LIEBERMAN
Keyword(s):  

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