Divergent effects of international regulatory institutions. Regulating global banks and shadow banking after the global financial crisis of 2007–2009

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 556-582
Author(s):  
Vincent Woyames Dreher
Author(s):  
Michael Schillig

The chapter provides an overview of the current state of the reform efforts in the jurisdictions under consideration with a focus on the institutional architecture, banking regulation, shadow banking, and financial market infrastructure. It briefly reviews the generally accepted causes of the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis, as well as the reform agenda at global/international level. It summarizes the reform efforts in the EU and the US that are of particular relevance for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. These reform efforts form the context in which the new recovery and resolution regime must be viewed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 955-965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Moloney

Some five years on from the Autumn 2008 collapse of Lehmans, the regulatory dust from the Global Financial Crisis has settled. Significant regulatory policy debates are still underway internationally, notably with respect to the treatment of shadow banking.1 But the main contours of the crisis-era regulatory landscape are now clear. Internationally, most major economies, including the EU, have implemented the G20 reform agenda, set out initially in the 2008 Washington Declaration,2 and covering, inter alia: bank capital, liquidity and leverage; hedge funds; rating agencies; and the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. That major regulatory change would have followed the financial crisis is not, of course, a surprise.3 Observation of responses to major financial crises over the years from the 1929 Crash to the ‘dotcom bubble’ era and beyond4 makes clear that what Professor Coffee has vividly described as the ‘regulatory sine curve’5 leads to a regulatory boom after financial market bust.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Schoenmaker

Purpose Large global banks were at the heart of the global financial crisis. In response to the crisis, the Financial Stability Board published an integrated set of policy measures, such as capital surcharges, to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Almost 10 years later, it is time to take stock of the impact of these measures. This paper answers three questions on what happened to the G-SIBs. First, have they shrunk in size? Second, are they better capitalised? Third, have they reduced their global reach? Design/methodology/approach This paper looks at the individual G-SIBs and compares the situation before the crisis with the current situation. In this methodology, the differences because of changes at individual banks and changes in the ranking within the group (composition effect) are disentangled. Data have been collected on these banks from SNL Financial (banking database) and annual reports. Findings First, a substantial increase in capital levels is seen, though the distribution is uneven. China and USA are leading the pact with leverage ratios (Tier 1 capital divided by total assets) of around 7 per cent for their large banks, whereas Europe and Japan are trailing behind with ratios between 4 and 5 per cent. Second, a strong composition effect is identified: a shift of business from the global European banks to the more domestic Asian banks, which are gradually increasing their global reach. The US banks keep their strong position. So, the decline in cross-border banking is largely because of a composition effect (i.e. a reshuffle of the global banking champions league) and far less due to a reduced global reach of individual banks. Research limitations/implications From the results on capital, recommendations are made on capital requirements (see below at social implications). Social implications It is noted that the euro area, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland trail behind with a leverage ratio between 4 and 5 per cent. It is recommended these countries bring the leverage ratio of their largest banks more in line with international practice. Originality/value The effects of the reform after the global financial crisis on the large global banks have not been researched in detail. This paper split the results by country of incorporation (home country). This gives interesting differences, which the paper relates to specific policies (or lack of policies) in these countries.


2013 ◽  
pp. 152-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Senchagov

Due to Russia’s exit from the global financial crisis, the fiscal policy of withdrawing windfall spending has exhausted its potential. It is important to refocus public finance to the real economy and the expansion of domestic demand. For this goal there is sufficient, but not realized financial potential. The increase in fiscal spending in these areas is unlikely to lead to higher inflation, given its actual trend in the past decade relative to M2 monetary aggregate, but will directly affect the investment component of many underdeveloped sectors, as well as the volume of domestic production and consumer demand.


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