Financial Reform Efforts since the Global Financial Crisis—An Overview

Author(s):  
Michael Schillig

The chapter provides an overview of the current state of the reform efforts in the jurisdictions under consideration with a focus on the institutional architecture, banking regulation, shadow banking, and financial market infrastructure. It briefly reviews the generally accepted causes of the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis, as well as the reform agenda at global/international level. It summarizes the reform efforts in the EU and the US that are of particular relevance for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. These reform efforts form the context in which the new recovery and resolution regime must be viewed.

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 955-965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Moloney

Some five years on from the Autumn 2008 collapse of Lehmans, the regulatory dust from the Global Financial Crisis has settled. Significant regulatory policy debates are still underway internationally, notably with respect to the treatment of shadow banking.1 But the main contours of the crisis-era regulatory landscape are now clear. Internationally, most major economies, including the EU, have implemented the G20 reform agenda, set out initially in the 2008 Washington Declaration,2 and covering, inter alia: bank capital, liquidity and leverage; hedge funds; rating agencies; and the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. That major regulatory change would have followed the financial crisis is not, of course, a surprise.3 Observation of responses to major financial crises over the years from the 1929 Crash to the ‘dotcom bubble’ era and beyond4 makes clear that what Professor Coffee has vividly described as the ‘regulatory sine curve’5 leads to a regulatory boom after financial market bust.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Bridgman

The global financial crisis (GFC) which began in 2007 with a liquidity squeeze in the US banking system and which continues to play out today has affected us all, whether through the collapse of the finance company sector, rising unemployment, falling housing prices or the recession which followed the initial market crash. The speed and scope of the crisis surprised most experts – policy makers included. Specialists from a myriad of disciplines, from economics and finance to risk management, corporate governance and property, are trying to make sense of what happened, why it happened and what it means for us now and into the future. Members of the public rely on the news media to keep them informed of the crisis as it unfolds and they rely on experts to translate these complex events into a language which they can understand. The GFC is educating us all, and it is important that we all learn from it to avoid making the same mistakes again. 


Bankarstvo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 68-87
Author(s):  
Milena Lazić ◽  
Ksenija Zorčić

Having drawn attention to the existing banking regulation issues, the Global Financial Crisis also raised awareness of the importance of depositors' confidence for the stability of the financial system, and brought the role and significance of the deposit guarantee schemes to the fore. Serbian economy started experiencing its effects in Q4 2008, in parallel with the global spreading of the crisis. This paper focuses on the fluctuations in deposit levels and structure in the Serbian banking system, between 2008 and 2019. It also aims to underscore the importance and development perspectives of the Serbian deposit guarantee scheme.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Aikman ◽  
Jonathan Bridges ◽  
Anil Kashyap ◽  
Caspar Siegert

How well equipped are today’s macroprudential regimes to deal with a rerun of the factors that led to the global financial crisis? To address the factors that made the last crisis so severe, a macroprudential regulator would need to implement policies to tackle vulnerabilities from financial system leverage, fragile funding structures, and the build-up in household indebtedness. We specify and calibrate a package of policy interventions to address these vulnerabilities—policies that include implementing the countercyclical capital buffer, requiring that banks extend the maturity of their funding, and restricting mortgage lending at high loan-to-income multiples. We then assess how well placed are two prominent macroprudential regulators, set up since the crisis, to implement such a package. The US Financial Stability Oversight Council has not been designed to implement such measures and would therefore make little difference were we to experience a rerun of the factors that preceded the last crisis. A macroprudential regulator modeled on the UK’s Financial Policy Committee stands a better chance because it has many of the necessary powers. But it too would face challenges associated with spotting build-ups in risk with sufficient prescience, acting sufficiently aggressively, and maintaining political backing for its actions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
Timothy Stenson

The US housing market is infamous on at least two counts: implicated in the global financial crisis and notorious for its unsustainable consumption of resources and consequent discharge of carbon dioxide. Lately anything like good news regarding housing in the USA is scarce. However, the pause resulting from the collapse of the market, and increasing concern regarding building's agency in the environment, combine to provide an opportunity to reconsider the form and performance of housing. This may yet create an opening for design.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 262
Author(s):  
Kim Sung-Hyun ◽  
Park Sang-Bum

Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, funds have been moved to safe assets from previously preferred risky assets on a global basis. Moreover, the financial crisis ignited in the U.S.A. led to strong quantitative easing policies, which played a major variable in the monetary policies of the major countries. So, the US treasury yield rates and Korean counterpart have showed signs of being synchronized. On the other hand, foreigners’ investments on Korean bonds became accelerated; the amount invested to Korean treasury by foreigners as well as their influence in the Korean treasury market has been expanded. Particularly, investment on the 10 year treasury bonds has increased, which spread influence of the Korean treasury market. In this regard, the study analyzed effects of the US treasury market on Korean counterpart. In order to analyze the volatility transfer effects from US treasury market to the KTB future market, in consideration of the synchronized maturity dates of the treasury and the officially announced prices, data on US 10 year treasury futures index and Korean 10 year treasury futures index . GARCH model was used for empirical analysis. Effects of the daily volatility and direction of US 10 year treasury futures index on the Korean counterpart was analyzed. Through the analysis, it was confirmed that information was transferred to the yield of Korean 10 year treasury futures index from the US counterpart. The study will be able to help establish more rational and efficient strategy for bond investment and operation.


Organization ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhaib Riaz ◽  
Sean Buchanan ◽  
Hari Bapuji

We draw on the institutional work literature to analyse the rhetoric in mainstream media spawned by the global financial crisis. We identify the emerging positions (status quo, neutral and change) of actors on major themes (policy, practices, recovery and regulation) related to the crisis and the rhetorical processes used (appeals to expert authority, finding someone to blame, use of scenarios, and avoidance of critical discussion) to communicate these positions. We find that academics lead the charge for change in policy, relying mostly on rhetorical processes that involve the use of past scenarios and blame, but also often avoid critical discussion through over-generalization. In contrast, banks focus on changes in practices, mostly using future scenarios, finding specific others to blame, and also appealing to expert authority. The US Federal Reserve takes the lead on maintaining the status quo on regulation-related issues, largely through using various scenarios and appeals to expert authority. We also find a large number of neutral positions and interpret this as tacit support for existing institutions. We conclude by charting out a broader research agenda for further investigation of the actors-institutions interplay, particularly within the context of the financial crisis.


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