The East Timor case and the role of the International Court of Justice in the evolution of the right of peoples to self-determination

1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-135
Author(s):  
Gino Naldi
2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova

AbstractThe article examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with the concept of peoples and peoples' rights in its jurisprudence. Most prominent has been the Court's role with respect to the right of self-determination and it is this issue that forms the core of the article. A second important question dealt with is the role of indigenous peoples in ICJ case practice, as the struggle by those peoples to gain collective rights is a recent development in international law. Drawing on this analysis, the discussion proceeds to consider the role that the ICJ has played in the development of the rights of peoples in general and what its future role might be in this sphere of international law. The article also examines the way in which the Court has allowed peoples to participate in its proceedings and whether and how its treatment of peoples' rights has strengthened the general foundations of international law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-330
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY GORDON

AbstractTraditional conceptions of the international community have come under stress in a time of expanding international public order. Various initiatives purport to observe a reconceived international community from a variety of perspectives: transnational, administrative, pluralist, constitutional, etc. The perspectives on this changing dynamic evidenced by the International Court of Justice, however, have been largely neglected. But as the principal judicial institution tasked with representing the diversity of legal perspectives in the world, the Court represents an important forum by which to understand the changing appreciation of international community. While decisions of the Court have been restrained, an active discourse has been carried forward among individual judges. I look at part of that discourse, organized around one perspective, which I refer to as innate cosmopolitanism, introduced to the forum of the ICJ by the opinions of Judge Álvarez. The innate cosmopolitan perspective reflects an idea of the international community as an autonomous collectivity, enjoying a will, interests, or ends of its own, independent of constituent states. The application of that perspective under international law is put most to test in matters of international security, in particular where the interest in a discrete, global public order runs up against the right to self-defence vested in states. The innate cosmopolitan perspective has not, in these cases, achieved a controlling position – but, over time, it has been part of a dialectical process showing a change in the appreciation of international community before the Court, and a changing perception from the bench of the role of the Court in that community.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain G.M. Scobbie ◽  
Catriona J. Drew

On 22 February 1991, Portugal filed a case against Australia in the Registry of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings in a dispute concerning “certain activities of Australia with regard to East Timor”. The impetus behind the case was the conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia in December 1989. The application alleged that Australia's conduct had caused “particularly serious legal and moral damage to the people of East Timor and to Portugal, which will become material damage also if the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources begins.” Jurisdiction was founded on the parties' declarations under Article 36(2) of the Statute.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-389
Author(s):  
Matthijs de Blois

The Mandate for Palestine has a unique character regarding both its beneficiaries, the Jewish people, wherever they live, and the obligations of the Mandatory power. At the same time it has been a burdensome stone right from the beginning. Representatives of Palestinian Arabs have rejected it as being incompatible with their right to self-determination. The policies of Great Britain, the Mandatory power, show a gradual departure from its obligations. The establishment of the Jewish national home became, instead of the primary obligation, just one of the duties of equal weight and content as others under the Mandate. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the relevance of the mandatory system in the light of Article 80 of the UN Charter has been recognised, inter alia, by the International Court of Justice. The unique character of the Palestine Mandate, however, has been kept under wraps. Some academic writings and legal actions by the Palestinians now offer a radical revisionism, which uses the Mandate as the legal basis for a Palestinian state. This trend is not without consequences for the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and for the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
JURE VIDMAR

AbstractIn the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice took the position that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rules of international law. This article does not dispute the final finding, but rather critically examines the Court's somewhat controversial reasoning and considers the added value of the opinion for the clarification of legal doctrine in relation to unilateral declarations of independence. An argument is made that the Court's interpretation of the question and the identification of the authors of the declaration had significant implications for the Court's final finding. Yet, the Court cannot be criticized for not answering the question of whether or not Kosovo is a state, whether Kosovo Albanians are beneficiaries of the right of self-determination, or even whether the ‘right to remedial secession’ is applicable. However, the Court may well have implicitly answered that recognition of Kosovo is not illegal.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Hippler Bello ◽  
Peter H. F. Bekker

International Court of Justice, June 30, 1995.Portugal submitted an Application instituting proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia before the International Court of Justice on February 22, 1991. Both Portugal and Australia had made declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute. Portugal sought a declaration from the Court that Portugal's status with respect to East Timor and the rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination, territorial integrity and unity, and permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources were opposable to Australia. Portugal also sought a declaration that Australia had incurred international responsibility and had caused damage for which it owed reparation to both the people of East Timor and Portugal. Portugal alleged that Australia had incurred this responsibility mainly by negotiating and concluding—not with Portugal, but with Indonesia—a treaty on December 11, 1989, creating a “Zone of Cooperation” in an area of the undelimited continental shelf between East Timor and northern Australia known as the “Timor Gap.”


1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.


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