The objective of this paper is to analyze the capital structure, the concentration of property and the policy of dividends as determinants of the problems of agency in Chilean companies. As a measure of agency costs, the asset turnover ratio was used as a benchmark for management efficiency in the use of the company's assets, which is an inverse measure of agency costs.
The results show that a higher level of indebtedness seems to favor the discretional behavior of managers. However, there is also evidence that when the debt is a short-term debt, the divergence of interest decreases between shareholders and managers.
The concentration of property on the other hand has a non-linear effect on the costs of agency, which means that, first, it acts as a mechanism to attenuate managerial discretion, but when it reaches a certain level, an effect of expropriation of major shareholders over minor shareholders seems to be produced. In relation to the dividend policy, a positive relationship is observed with efficiency in the use of assets, mainly in the presence of high growth opportunities.
R&D, Agency Costs and Capital Structure: International Evidence
