The Gospel of Climate Skepticism: Why Evangelical Christians Oppose Action on Climate Change

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-562
Author(s):  
Richard Bohannon
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-165
Author(s):  
Anne Pasek

Review of: The Gospel of Climate Skepticism: Why Evangelical Christians Oppose Action on Climate Change, Robin Globus Veldman (2019) Oakland: University of California Press, 332 pp., ISBN 978-0-52030-367-6, p/bk, $29.95


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-165
Author(s):  
Anne Pasek

Review of: The Gospel of Climate Skepticism: Why Evangelical Christians Oppose Action on Climate Change, Robin Globus Veldman (2019) Oakland: University of California Press, 332 pp., ISBN 978-0-52030-367-6, p/bk, $29.95


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-91
Author(s):  
Aaron Ricker

Statistically speaking, American Evangelical Christians are uniquely attracted to apocalyptic conspiracy theories when it comes to the topic of climate change. Since Evangelicals constitute a powerful voting/lobbying/shopping bloc, it is worth asking why this might be the case and what (if anything) can be done about it. To this end, my study considers the relevance of two major cultural tributaries to American Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture. In the first section I consider biblical apocalyptic culture and argue that the characteristic apocalyptic promise to disclose hidden divine plans to a misunderstood but soon-tobe- vindicated elect group naturally entails conspiracy-theory thinking. I argue further that apocalyptic imagination and conspiracy-theory thinking are powerful tools for the definition of identity and community. In the second section I turn my attention to the kind of Evangelical pop apocalyptic culture that helped push climate science denial into the Christian mainstream. I argue that in pop apocalyptic productions like the influential tracts and comics of Jack T. Chick, the image of the elect as the persecuted and powerful bearers of special knowledge found a new lease on life, and continues to fascinate millions with the attractive offer of somebody special to be and somewhere special to belong. I conclude that apocalyptic questions of crisis and conspiracy have a sociological function, as means to the end of defining social identity. Understanding this concrete function of conspiracy-theory thinking in Christian apocalyptic imagination can help in assessing and addressing the troubling phenomenon of Evangelical climate denial.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Goodwin

Abstract A case study of a short televised debate between a climate scientist and an advocate for climate skepticism provides the basis for developing a contemporary conception of sophistry. The sophist has a high degree of argumentative content knowledge – knowledge of a domain selected and structured in ways that are most germane for its use in making arguments. The sophist also makes the deliberate choice to argue for a disreputable view, one that goes against the views of the majority, or of the experts. Sophistry, drawing as it does on argumentative skill, is difficult to manage. The best approach is likely to refuse debate; but if debate is unavoidable, then the sophist must be met with equal skill. It will be hard to develop such skill, however, as long as the sophist’s view is thought to be disreputable.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Merkley ◽  
Dominik Stecula

Supporters of the Republican Party have become much more skeptical of the science of climate change since the 1990s. We argue that backlash to out-group cues from Democratic elites played an important role in this process. We construct aggregate measures of climate skepticism from nearly 200 public opinion polls at the quarterly level from 2001 to 2014 and at the annual level from 1986 to 2014. We also build time series measures of possible contributors to climate skepticism using an automated media content analysis. Our analyses provide evidence that cues from party elites – especially from Democrats – are associated with aggregate dynamics in climate change skepticism including among supporters of the Republican Party. We then conduct a party cue survey experiment on a sample of 3,000 Americans through Amazon Mechanical Turk to provide more evidence of causality. Together, these results draw attention to the importance of out-group cue-taking and suggest we should see climate change skepticism through the lens of elite-led opinion formation.


Author(s):  
Trevor Diehl ◽  
Brigitte Huber ◽  
Homero Gil de Zúñiga ◽  
James Liu

Abstract This study explores the individual- and country-level factors that influence how getting news from social media relates to people’s beliefs about anthropogenic climate change. Concepts of psychological distance and motivated reasoning are tested using multilevel analysis with survey data in 20 countries (N = 18,785). Results suggest that using social media for news is associated with a decrease in climate skepticism across the sample. However, social context at the individual-level (conservative political ideology and low trust in science) and at the macro-level (high gross domestic product and individualism) moderate the effect, and therefore reduce social media’s potential to inform the public about climate change. This study contributes to conversations about the ability of emerging media to address science issues, particularly in developing countries.


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