A Method of Resolutions: Rereading NE 7.1, 1145b2–7

This article is about the methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b2–7, and the way they are carried out in the following chapters. I argue that the procedure therein described does not aim to establish consistency among a subset of endoxa, but to test and refine—by considering and resolving objections against them—endoxa that could enter into a nominal definition of continence and incontinence. The dialectical lineage of this discussion, if there is one, is to be found in the use of the critical procedure of resolution that can be traced back to Topics and Sophistical Refutations.

Anonymus Cantabrigiensis: Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos Aristotelis edited by Sten Ebbesen

The publication of the critical edition of this anonymous commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is something to be celebrated for numerous reasons. Needless to say, it is of great value for scholars interested in the reception of this particular item of the corpus Aristotelicum, especially since the editor is responsible for much of our current knowledge within the field. Reviewed by: Gustavo Fernandez Walker, Published Online (2021-08-31)Copyright © 2021 by Gustavo Fernandez WalkerThis open access publication is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (CC BY-NC-ND) Article PDF Link: https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/aestimatio/article/view/37734/28735 Corresponding Author: Gustavo Fernandez Walker,University of GothenburgE-Mail: [email protected]

Quantifying Aristotle’s Fallacies

Fallacies are logically false statements which are often considered to be true. In the “Sophistical Refutations”, the last of his six works on Logic, Aristotle identified the first thirteen of today’s many known fallacies and divided them into linguistic and non-linguistic ones. A serious problem with fallacies is that, due to their bivalent texture, they can under certain conditions disorient the nonexpert. It is, therefore, very useful to quantify each fallacy by determining the “gravity” of its consequences. This is the target of the present work, where for historical and practical reasons—the fallacies are too many to deal with all of them—our attention is restricted to Aristotle’s fallacies only. However, the tools (Probability, Statistics and Fuzzy Logic) and the methods that we use for quantifying Aristotle’s fallacies could be also used for quantifying any other fallacy, which gives the required generality to our study.

ERISTIC, ANTILOGY AND THE EQUAL DISPOSITION OF MEN AND WOMEN (PLATO, RESP. 5.453B–454C)

Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations (= Soph. el.) seeks to uncover the workings of apparent deductive reasoning, and is thereby largely devoted to the caricature of dialectic that the ancients called eristic (ἐριστική), the art of quarrelling. Unlike antilogy (ἀντιλογία), which refers to a type of argumentation where two arguments are pitted against each other in a contradictory manner, eristic takes on in Aristotle an exclusively pejorative meaning, as is made clear, for example, by this passage from Soph. el.: ‘For just as unfairness in a contest is a definite type of fault, and is a kind of foul fighting, so the art of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation.’

Relativity in Categories 7, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations

Aristotle discusses relatives in the Categories, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations. This chapter begins to argue that Aristotle adapted Plato’s ideas about relativity into an Aristotelian framework. In the Categories, Aristotle defines relatives (6a36–b10) then discusses four hallmarks of the class of relatives: contrariety (6b15–18), scalability (6b19–27), reciprocity (6b28–7b14), and simultaneity (7b15–8a12). This chapter clarifies what these hallmarks are and shows how constitutive relativity is involved in the hallmarks. The chapter goes on to discuss how Aristotle treats the idea that relatives can fall into genus and species structures and how Aristotle treats the definition of relatives.

An Institutional Approach to Ancient Philosophical Texts: Plato’s Ion

The institutional approach to interpreting philosophical texts, which is a valuable supplement to the traditional historical, philological, and philosophical methods of analysis, requires from the reader a reflective technique and an understanding of the kind of statements it can validate. Factors such as the author’s self-esteem and its effect on the process of creating the text, as well as the intended genre and audience are all brought into the material studied (a philosophical text) through the institutional approach. Meeting all these requirements results in a delineation of an institution that permits objectification of the author’s stance and manner of inquiry. An analysis of the Plato’s Ion, which is usually considered one of the earliest of his dialogues, offers an example the institutional approach to philosophical texts. The article calls into question an early date for Ion because Plato’s earlier dialogues are typically retellings of previous conversations. The Ion, however, consists of direct dialogue in a dramatic format - a style proper to the late dialogues, which reflect the technique developed for the arguments and disputations between schools; these debates were conducted according to certain rules and referred to summaries of material previously selected (as Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations demonstrate). Furthermore, the Ion echoes Plato’s Republic (just as Homer in the Republic is not versed in the arts and crafts, the rhapsodist in the Ion who recites Homer’s depictions of those skills likewise has not mastered any of them) and with the Phaedrus (which like the Ion explores the concept of divine madness). These parallels strongly suggest that the Ion is among the later dialogues and consequently call its attribution to Plato into question.

Sophistical refutations in the climate change debates

A case study of a short televised debate between a climate scientist and an advocate for climate skepticism provides the basis for developing a contemporary conception of sophistry. The sophist has a high degree of argumentative content knowledge – knowledge of a domain selected and structured in ways that are most germane for its use in making arguments. The sophist also makes the deliberate choice to argue for a disreputable view, one that goes against the views of the majority, or of the experts. Sophistry, drawing as it does on argumentative skill, is difficult to manage. The best approach is likely to refuse debate; but if debate is unavoidable, then the sophist must be met with equal skill. It will be hard to develop such skill, however, as long as the sophist’s view is thought to be disreputable.

Going Through Aporiai: The Critical Use of Aristotle’s Dialectic

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lusis) of an argument. These two terms are employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations.