How did negative liberty become a liberal ideal?

Author(s):  
Efraim Podoksik ◽  
Yiftah Elazar
Author(s):  
Andrew T. Kenyon

This chapter explores the positive structural dimensions of the freedom of speech by using a democratic free speech rationale. While far from the only aspect of positive free speech, it offers a useful example of the freedom’s positive dimensions. The chapter focuses on legal conditions underlying public speech and their links to democratic constitutional arrangements. It outlines the general approach before drawing brief comparisons with two well-known US approaches to free speech and media freedom. The chapter then highlights two of the multiple ways in which ‘positive’ can be used in relation to free speech. Positive may concern positive freedom, the idea that freedom is not only a negative liberty but requires support or enablement. It can also be used in terms of a positive right, typically a legal right enforced through courts.


1971 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-183
Author(s):  
M. H. Stannus
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
QUENTIN SKINNER
Keyword(s):  

This chapter analyses Sir Isaiah Berlin's theory of liberty, In particular, it focuses on Berlin's most celebrated contribution to the debate, his essay entitled ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. Berlin identifies two concepts of liberty, one positive and the other negative. He assumes that, whenever we speak about negative liberty, we must be speaking about absence of interference. The chapter isolates a third concept of liberty. It attempts to show that we have inherited two rival and incommensurable theories of negative liberty, although in recent times we have generally contrived to ignore one of them.


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