Freedom of Expression and Democracy

This chapter focuses on the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy from both a historical and a theoretical perspective. The term ‘freedom of expression’ includes free speech, freedom of the press, the right to petition government, and freedom of political association. Eighteenth-century proponents of popular government had long offered democratic justifications for freedom of expression. The chapter then demonstrates that freedom of political expression is a necessary component of democracy. It describes two core functions of such expression: an informing and a legitimating one. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of ‘democracy’, noting various ways in which democracies vary among themselves, as well as the implications of those variations for freedom of expression. Even before democratic forms of government took root in the modern world.

Parades, Picketing, and Demonstrations

This chapter focuses on parades, pickets, and demonstrations, which are forms of civic engagement that communicate aspirations, ideas, and, quite often, dissenting opinions to fellow citizens, governments, and broader audiences. For many, gathering together in public, in these and similar forms, is a cathartic act of self-fulfilment and a demonstration of solidarity. Collective action in the form of public gatherings is an integral part of any system of communicative freedom. In the United States, in addition to the freedom of speech, rights to ‘peaceably assemble’ and to ‘petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ are explicitly provided for in the First Amendment to the Constitution. Ultimately, parades, pickets, and demonstrations all further basic expressive values relating to self-governance, the search for truth, and individual autonomy. Nevertheless, Americans seeking to engage in collective modes of expression face a variety of doctrinal, legal, social, and political challenges. The chapter then details how digital connectivity has facilitated expressive opportunities by connecting individuals and supporting new forms of associational activity.

Insult of Public Officials

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

Positive Free Speech: A Democratic Freedom

This chapter explores the positive structural dimensions of the freedom of speech by using a democratic free speech rationale. While far from the only aspect of positive free speech, it offers a useful example of the freedom’s positive dimensions. The chapter focuses on legal conditions underlying public speech and their links to democratic constitutional arrangements. It outlines the general approach before drawing brief comparisons with two well-known US approaches to free speech and media freedom. The chapter then highlights two of the multiple ways in which ‘positive’ can be used in relation to free speech. Positive may concern positive freedom, the idea that freedom is not only a negative liberty but requires support or enablement. It can also be used in terms of a positive right, typically a legal right enforced through courts.

Glorifying Censorship? Anti-Terror Law, Speech, and Online Regulation

This chapter investigates how many Western democracies—and the European Union—are enacting increasingly draconian measures against terrorist-related speech that undermine long-standing free speech principles. It outlines a number of factors that tend towards skewed perceptions of the risks of terrorism. The chapter then sketches the rapid spread of laws aimed at terrorist propaganda, noting the unusual role of the UN Security Council in ‘directing national legislative practice’ in the criminal sphere. While there are legitimate arguments for restricting certain types of terrorist material, existing laws and policies tend indiscriminately to lump truly dangerous material together with mere expressions of support or sympathy for groups that use violence, including against despotic regimes, or groups that once, but no longer, used violence to achieve political ends. Skewed perceptions of the threat of terrorism appears to have an almost unique capacity to cause the weakening, if not outright abandonment of the standards that normally provide robust expression to freedom of speech.

The Structure of a Free Speech Right

This chapter describes the structural elements or components of a free speech right. The nature and extent of a free speech right depends upon a number of legal components. The first is the legal source of the right (in common law, statute, or a constitution) and the force of the right having regard to how it is enforced, and whether and how it can be superseded. The second component is the ‘subject’ of free speech rights, or who are the rights-holders: citizens, natural or legal persons. The third is the ‘scope’ of a free speech right, while the fourth is the kind of obligation it imposes on others: a negative prohibition or a positive obligation. The fifth component is the ‘object’ of a free speech right: who is bound to respect a right of freedom of expression and against whom the right may be asserted. Finally, there is the ‘limitation’ of a free speech right.

Economic Perspectives on Free Speech

This chapter explores the potential for economic analysis to illuminate freedom of speech. For early scholars of law and economics, the similarities and differences between the metaphorical marketplace for ideas and literal markets for goods and services were subjects of much attention. The chapter then argues that information economics has the potential to explain failures in the ‘marketplace of ideas’. Just as information asymmetry in the market for goods and services allows low quality goods and services to drive high quality goods and services out of the marketplace, there is reason to think that ‘bad speech’ will tend to drive out the ‘good’. For good information to compete in the market, readers and listeners must be able to tell the difference between good and bad information—an idea with particular resonance in the age of ‘fake news’, and with potential implications for the design of free-speech laws.

Free Speech and Elections

This chapter examines how elections give rise to special problems relating to speech. In the choice of government and governors, speech needs to be lively and robust, which is not to say of course that speech should be unconstrained. Indeed, the paradox of elections is that they need both freedom and restraint if electoral purposes are to be served. In the context between candidates and parties, who else should be permitted to speak, and what if anything should they be prohibited from saying? In the context of elections, however, what has become a bigger concern in modern liberal democracies is not who may speak and what can they say, but what means can they use, what opportunities and restrictions are to apply to the means used, and how much can be spent in projecting electoral messages? These latter questions do not address the content of speech so much as its volume, but they are urgent questions in light of the exponential increase in the sums spent by candidates, parties, and others in seeking to influence electoral outcomes.

Freedom of Speech in International Law

This chapter traces the broad contours of the right to freedom of speech as it has evolved in international law, principally under Article 19(2) of the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or ‘the Covenant’). Any speech protective principles deriving from the international jurisprudence are qualified by the following factors: the contextual contingency of the value of speech, the inherently limited reach of international scrutiny, the changing nature of the marketplace, and emerging forms of censorship. The chapter then outlines the key human rights treaty protections for freedom of speech, before further exploring the scope of the right. It examines the permissible grounds for speech restriction, highlighting two contested categories of speech—namely, incitement to hatred and glorification of terrorism—where international law not only concedes the low value of such speech, but specifically mandates its prohibition in domestic law. States that introduce broadly framed speech restrictions may claim to be acting in satisfaction of this prohibitory requirement. In consequence, the intensity of any ensuing international scrutiny will inevitably be substantially reduced.

Religious Speech

This chapter examines religious speech, and the tensions between religion and freedom of expression. As a wide-ranging system of moral beliefs and commitments, religion, by its very nature, assigns to the freedom of expression a particular place in its hierarchical order of values. In non-theocratic States, this may clash with the (higher) normative value accorded to the freedom of expression under the secular order. Religious claims themselves will often be made from within the constitutional system: that is, the State’s own constitutional commitment to protect religious freedom will be invoked to argue that, in certain domains, the secular order must defer to religion’s hierarchy of values. This may include the subordination of religious expression to revealed religious truth. Disputes will often also involve contestation over a constellation of other constitutional norms, such as the commitment to maintaining diversity and pluralism, the right to equality and cultural dissent, and not least, the imperatives of public order. Consequently, such disputes raise a host of complex issues. The State’s adjudicatory authorities must decide whether to attempt an accommodation between the conflicting claims of religion and free speech, or privilege one over the other. The chapter then discusses the role of religion in censorship.