Liberalisms and the limits of knowledge and freedom: On the epistemological and social bases of negative liberty

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darrow Schecter
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

Opponents of Kant suppose he thinks that autonomy gives rational beings a special kind of intrinsic value. Since knowledge of intrinsic values would have to be a kind of metaphysical knowledge, this interpretation is contrary to Kant’s strictures on the limits of knowledge. Rather, Kant thinks that only rational beings can engage in reciprocal lawmaking, which is the source of moral laws. Animals cannot obligate us in the sense of participating in making laws for us. This, however, ignores a second sense in which we can have duties to animals: the laws we make for the treatment of people might also cover the treatment of animals. The chapter ends by explaining why it is hard to get this kind of conclusion using the universalization test.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
P Cooke

The question of whether class or territory is the stronger basis of social mobilisation is examined. It is suggested that the economic problems being experienced by many older industrial areas can give rise to regional coalitions that seek to transcend class antagonisms in order to press for state investment to improve regional growth and employment prospects. But it is further argued that, because of the heterogeneity of the sociospatial base in such regions, supralocal coalitions will be vulnerable to the effects of allocative decisions favouring particular within-region locations. The notion of the vulnerability of regional social bases to the expression of local class interests is explored in the context of industrial South Wales. This region has been subject to successive attempts at economic revival, often in response to an apparently coherent regional voice pressing for state regional interventions. Important parts of various policies for restructuring the regional economy have been defeated in the past, precisely because of the impotence of regional coalitions to carry disadvantaged local class groupings along with them. On occasions, such local class groupings have been capable of mobilising popular support, indicating more the defensive than offensive nature of their power.


1984 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Smith Kutolowski
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andrew T. Kenyon

This chapter explores the positive structural dimensions of the freedom of speech by using a democratic free speech rationale. While far from the only aspect of positive free speech, it offers a useful example of the freedom’s positive dimensions. The chapter focuses on legal conditions underlying public speech and their links to democratic constitutional arrangements. It outlines the general approach before drawing brief comparisons with two well-known US approaches to free speech and media freedom. The chapter then highlights two of the multiple ways in which ‘positive’ can be used in relation to free speech. Positive may concern positive freedom, the idea that freedom is not only a negative liberty but requires support or enablement. It can also be used in terms of a positive right, typically a legal right enforced through courts.


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