Regional mobilization in international trade policy: The US states in transatlantic trade negotiations

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Julian Jaursch
1988 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 56-72
Author(s):  
JERRY A. HAUSMAN ◽  
JEFFREY K. MACKIE-MASON

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (12) ◽  
pp. 4104-4146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Ossa

How large are optimal tariffs? What tariffs would prevail in a worldwide trade war? How costly would a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation be? And what is the scope for future multilateral trade negotiations? I address these and other questions using a unified framework which nests traditional, new trade, and political economy motives for protection. I find that optimal tariffs average 62 percent, world trade war tariffs average 63 percent, the government welfare losses from a breakdown of international trade policy cooperation average 2.9 percent, and the possible government welfare gains from future multilateral trade negotiations average 0.5 percent. (JEL F12, F13, O19)


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Victor Purba

"Section 301" memberikan wewenang luas kepada Presiden AS untuk mengambil tindakanpembalasan terhadap praktek-praktek perdagangan negara asing yang dianggap merugikan AS. Keampuhan Section 301 ini antara lain berhasil membuka pasar bagi barang-barang Amerika di luar negeri. Umpamanya Jepang, yang akhirnya bersedia menerima penjualan alat-alat telekomunikasi, jeruk dan daging asal AS. Namun, ancaman Section 301 tidak selalu berhasil membuka pasar luar negeri. Sengketa kemudian diselesaikan dalam pertemuan-pertemuan GATT.


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