PurposeWith the rapid growth of the economy, people have increasingly higher living standards, and although people simply pursued material wealth in the past, they now pay more attention to material quality and safety and environmental protection. This paper discusses the lack of motivation for investing in fresh-keeping technology for agricultural products by individual members of an agricultural supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer by means of mathematical models and data simulations and discuss the optimal price-invest strategies under different sales models.Design/methodology/approachFirst, based on the model of no investment by both sides (NN), this paper considers three models: supplier only (MN), retailer only (NR) and cooperative investment (MR). Then, the authors analyze the influence of consumer price sensitivity and freshness sensitivity on the investment motivation of agricultural products under four models. Subsequently, the paper makes a sensitivity analysis of the optimal strategies under several models, and makes a game analysis of the suppliers and retailers of agricultural products. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis through specific values.FindingsThe results show that (a) when the two sides cooperate, the amount of investment is largest, the freshness of the agricultural products is highest, and the sales volume is greatest; however, when both sides do not invest, the freshness of agricultural products and sales volume are lowest. (b) The price and freshness sensitivity of the consumer have an impact on investment decisions. Greater freshness sensitivity corresponds to a higher investment, higher agricultural product price, greater sales volume, and greater supply chain member income and overall income; however, greater price sensitivity corresponds to a lower investment, lower agricultural product price, lower sales volume, fewer supply chain members and lower overall income. (c) The investment game between the supplier and retailer is not only related to the sensitivity to price and freshness but also to the coordination coefficients of interest. At the same time, the market position of agricultural products should be considered when making decisions. The market share of agricultural products will affect the final game equilibrium and then affect the final benefit of the supply chain and individual members.Practical implicationsThese results provide managerial insights for enterprises preparing to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.Originality/valueAt present, the main problem is that member enterprises of agricultural supply chains operate based on their own benefits and are resistant to investing alone to improve the freshness of agricultural products. Instead, they would prefer that other members invest so that they may reap the benefits at no cost. Therefore, the enterprises in each node of the agricultural product supply chain are not motivated enough to invest, and competition and game states are observed among them, and such behavior is definitely not conducive to improving the freshness of agricultural products. However, the current research on agricultural products is more about price, quality and greenness, etc., and there are few studies on agricultural investment. Through the establishment of the model, this paper is expected to provide theoretical suggestions for the supply chain enterprises that plan to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Knowledge-Sharing Behavior in the Construction Supply Chain