An efficient response identification strategy for nonlinear structures subject to nonstationary generated seismic excitations

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Bamer ◽  
Bernd Markert
Author(s):  
Jie Liu ◽  
Tianqi Ding ◽  
Shanhui Liu ◽  
Bingbing Hu

Dynamic force is the key indicator for monitoring the condition of a mechanical product. These mechanical structures always encompass some nonlinear factors. Most previous studies focused on obtaining the dynamic force of linear structures. Consequently, this study focuses on the nonlinear mechanical structure, and a novel identification strategy is proposed to indirectly identify the excitation force. For the identification strategy, based on a nonlinear state-space model, a force identification equation for the nonlinear structure is built, wherein the transfer matrix consists of coefficient matrices of the nonlinear state-space model, and these coefficient matrices are calculated by a nonlinear subspace identification algorithm. Then, under the generalized cross-validation criterion, the truncated total least squares method is introduced to solve the ill-posed equation to eventually obtain the excitation force of the nonlinear structure. The identification results from two numerical simulation cases and one experimental case illustrate that the proposed identification strategy can stably and accurately identify the excitation force of nonlinear structures.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piergiorgio Alessandri ◽  
Andrea Giovanni Gazzani ◽  
Alejandro Vicondoa

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1033-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Li ◽  
Jihong Zhu ◽  
Fengwen Wang ◽  
Weihong Zhang ◽  
Ole Sigmund

Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.


1993 ◽  
Vol 119 (12) ◽  
pp. 2449-2460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Zembaty ◽  
Steen Krenk

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