Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking

Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Tenove

There are longstanding calls for international organizations (IOs) to be more inclusive of the voices and interests of people whose lives they affect. There is nevertheless widespread disagreement among practitioners and political theorists over who ought to be included in IO decision-making and by what means. This paper focuses on the inclusion of IOs’ ‘intended beneficiaries,’ both in principle and practice. It argues that IOs’ intended beneficiaries have particularly strong normative claims for inclusion because IOs can affect their vital interests and their political agency. It then examines how these claims to inclusion might be feasibly addressed. The paper proposes a model of inclusion via representation and communication, or ‘mediated inclusion.’ An examination of existing practices in global governance reveals significant opportunities for the mediated inclusion of IOs’ intended beneficiaries, as well as pervasive obstacles. The paper concludes that the inclusion of intended beneficiaries by IOs is both appropriate and feasible.


Author(s):  
Frank A. Stengel ◽  
Rainer Baumann

The rise of non-state (international, private, and transnational) actors in global politics has far-reaching consequences for foreign policy theory and practice. In order to be able to explain foreign policy in the 21st century, foreign policy research needs to take into account the growing importance of nonstate actorss. A good way to do this would be to engage the literature on globalization and global governance. Both fields would benefit from such an exchange of ideas because their respective strengths could cancel out each other’s weaknesses. Foreign policy research, on the one hand, has a strong track record explaining foreign policy outcomes, using a broad range of theoretical concepts, but almost completely ignores non-state actors. This is highly problematic for at least two reasons: first, foreign policy is increasingly made in international organizations and intergovernmental and transnational governance networks instead of national institutions like foreign ministries. Second, the latter increasingly open up to, and involve, non-state actors in their policymaking procedures. Thus, if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized in the future, it needs to take into account this change. However, systemic approaches like neorealism or constructivism have difficulties adapting to the new reality of foreign policy. They stress the importance of states at the expense of non-state actors, which are only of marginal interest to them, as is global governance. Moreover, they also conceptualize states as unitary actors, which forecloses the possibility of examining the involvement of non-state actors in states’ decision-making processes. Agency-based approaches such as foreign policy analysis (FPA) fare much better, at least in principle. FPA scholars stress the importance of disaggregating the state and looking at the individuals and group dynamics that influence their decision-making. However, while this commitment to opening up the state allows for a great deal more flexibility vis-à-vis different types of actors, FPA research has so far remained state-centric and only very recently turned to non-state actors. On the other hand, non-state actors’ involvement in policymaking is the strong suit of the literature on globalization and global governance, which has spent a lot of time and effort analyzing various forms of “hybrid” governance. At the same time, however, this literature has been rather descriptive, so far mainly systematizing different governance arrangements and the conditions under which non-state actors are included in governance arrangements. This literature could profit from foreign policy research’s rich theoretical knowledge in explaining policy outcomes in hybrid governance networks and international organizations (IOs). Foreign policy researchers should take non-state actors seriously. In this regard, three avenues in particular are relevant for future research: (1) comparative empirical research to establish the extent of non-state actors’ participation in foreign policymaking across different countries and governance arrangements; (2) explanatory studies that analyze the conditions under which non-state actors are involved in states’ foreign policymaking processes; and (3) the normative implications of increased hybrid foreign policymaking for democratic legitimacy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 337-393
Author(s):  
Uma Lele ◽  
Brian C. Baldwin ◽  
Sambuddha Goswami

In this chapter, key issues facing governance of international organizations are discussed, as operating arms of global governance in the larger context of global governance of food and agriculture—specifically, in the context of the United Nations’ financing. Governance of each of the five international organizations is outlined: how the organizations were originally structured and financed; how financing relates to the organizational structure and governance; and how the formal and informal voices of members are exercised are discussed, with respect to the choice of leadership and the substantive content of what the organizations do and how. Issues of coordination among the Rome-based agencies, the World Bank, and CGIAR are discussed, given that the world is undergoverned in relation to the challenges of meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, confronting climate change, conflict, natural resource degradation, income inequality, persistent poverty, and growing hunger. With greater long-term, core-funding support, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) would be able to translate its guidelines into operations to combat climate change and promote conservation agriculture and its Codex Alimentarius into food safety. With collaboration with the World Food Programme, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World Bank, FAO can help move fragile countries into rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development. CGIAR can use long-term funding, while the World Bank and IFAD can support the building of delivery systems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonella Angelini

The World Bank has a large partnership portfolio, including international organizations and private actors. Due to their diversity and to the ambitious programs they pursue, partners are highly exposed to financial and operational risk. Curbing this risk takes different shapes in the legal design of partnerships. In particular, partnerships differ in terms of the degree of legal continuity along the stages of decision-making, management of funds and program implementation. This configuration raises several problems for the attribution of international legal responsibility for partnership-related activities. In some cases, the problem is one of attribution of conduct at the level of the partnership’s governing body as well as at that of implementation. More broadly, the policy of risk management leads to a dilution of control within the partnership chain. This means that one can construe only certain partnership programmes, or certain segments of a partnership, as amassing enough control for responsibility to arise.


2013 ◽  
pp. 4-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Grigoryev ◽  
A. Kurdin

The coordination of economic activity at the global level is carried out through different mechanisms, which regulate activities of companies, states, international organizations. In spite of wide diversity of entrenched mechanisms of governance in different areas, they can be classified on the basis of key characteristics, including distribution of property rights, mechanisms of governance (in the narrow sense according to O. Williamson), mechanisms of expansion. This approach can contribute not only to classifying existing institutions but also to designing new ones. The modern aggravation of global problems may require rethinking mechanisms of global governance. The authors offer the universal framework for considering this problem and its possible solutions.


Author(s):  
Gisela Hirschmann

How can international organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN) and their implementing partners be held accountable if their actions and policies violate fundamental human rights? Political scientists and legal scholars have shed a much-needed light on the limits of traditional accountability when it comes to complex global governance. However, conventional studies on IO accountability fail to systematically analyze a related, puzzling empirical trend: human rights violations that occur in the context of global governance do not go unnoticed altogether; they are investigated and sanctioned by independent third parties. This book puts forward the concept of pluralist accountability, whereby third parties hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable for human rights violations. We can expect pluralist accountability to evolve if a competitive environment stimulates third parties to enact accountability and if the implementing actors are vulnerable to human rights demands. Based on a comprehensive study of UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the European Union Troika’s austerity policy, and global public–private health partnerships in India, this book demonstrates how competition and human rights vulnerability shape the evolution of pluralist accountability in response to diverse human rights violations, such as human trafficking, the violation of the rights of detainees, economic rights, and the right to consent in clinical trials. While highlighting the importance of studying alternative accountability mechanisms, this book also argues that pluralist accountability should not be regarded as a panacea for IOs’ legitimacy problems, as it is often less legalized and might cause multiple accountability disorder.


2021 ◽  
pp. 223386592110248
Author(s):  
Yooneui Kim ◽  
Youngwan Kim

Are international organizations autonomous actors in global politics? This paper investigates whether and how major powers influence the World Bank’s official development assistance policies. Despite the World Bank’s attempts to maintain independence from its member states, we argue that major powers are still influential. Testing this expectation with the data of official development assistance provisions between 1981 and 2017, we find that the World Bank provides a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipient countries that receive a higher amount of such assistance from the major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. In addition, the World Bank is prone to provide a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipients that have a similar preference to the major powers. This study sheds light on the relations between major powers and international organizations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016224392199910
Author(s):  
Nina Frahm ◽  
Tess Doezema ◽  
Sebastian Pfotenhauer

Long presented as a universal policy-recipe for social prosperity and economic growth, the promise of innovation seems to be increasingly in question, giving way to a new vision of progress in which society is advanced as a central enabler of technoeconomic development. Frameworks such as “Responsible” or “Mission-oriented” Innovation, for example, have become commonplace parlance and practice in the governance of the innovation–society nexus. In this paper, we study the dynamics by which this “social fix” to technoscience has gained legitimacy in institutions of global governance by investigating recent projects at two international organizations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission, to mainstream “Responsible Innovation” frameworks and instruments across countries. Our analysis shows how the turn to societal participation in both organizations relies on a new deficit logic—a democratic deficit of innovation—that frames a lack of societal engagement in innovation governance as a major barrier to the uptake and dissemination of new technologies. These deficit politics enable global governance institutions to present “Responsible Innovation” frameworks as the solution and to claim authority over the coproduction of particular forms of democracy and innovation as intertwined pillars of a market-liberal international order.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document