Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (10) ◽  
pp. 2225-2244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangbin Sun ◽  
Cheng Cheng ◽  
Shenggang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies

Innovation-Supporting Effect of Government Versus Private Venture Capital: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-281
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Tao ◽  
Yang Li
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Negative Binomial ◽  
Negative Binomial Regression ◽  
Threshold Effect ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Threshold Test ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
Private Venture ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Venture capital (VC) can promote the innovation of invested enterprises through financial support, social networking, and intellectual capital. Based on data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2016, this study, firstly, compares the impact of government and private VC on enterprise innovation using Possion regression, and applies the ITCV method and Negative Binomial Regression for Robustness Examination, then, explores the relationship between their shareholding percentage and enterprise innovation with threshold test. The results show that: the performance of private VC is significantly positive and in line. With the increasing shareholding percentage of private VC, the innovation of invested enterprises increases. The overall performance of government VC, however, is not significant, and the shareholding percentage of government VC also has no significant impact on the innovation of invested companies. Additional testing revealed that a “threshold effect” however exists in the impact of the shareholding percentage of government VC on innovation: within a certain range, the higher the shareholding percentage, the more significant the impact on innovations becomes, but beyond that range, the percentage is inversely related to innovation.

scholarly journals Self-interest or win-win: Determinants of executive compensation in China

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-127
Author(s):  
Zhen Chen ◽  
Fei Guo
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Self Interest

This paper studies the determinants of executive compensation in listed firms in China between 2002 and 2005. There is significantly positive elasticity of compensation to scale. Moreover, corporate performance is positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale. We find that both agency theory and managerialism hold true in Chinese listed companies. Compensation contract is the result of the game by stockholders and managers

scholarly journals REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Lin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies

Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context of China.Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political reward. The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be taken.

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