scholarly journals REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin Lin

Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context of China.Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political reward. The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be taken.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Ji Li

The “in-house counsel movement” of the past few decades, with its far-reaching implications for the legal profession, the legal service market, and corporate governance, has attracted a great deal of academic attention. Few scholars, however, have examined the global expansion of emerging market companies and their in-house legal capacity. To narrow the gap, this article investigates the in-house legal capacity of Chinese firms in the United States. In doing so, it focuses on two important yet underexplored questions: (1) whether and how institutions in China influence the capacity building; and (2) whether the Chinese investors’ ownership structure makes a difference in that regard. By analyzing a unique set of survey data and 122 interviews with lawyers, in-house counsel, and business executives, this article uncovers evidence of both multi-institutional influence and state-ownership effects. The findings contribute to theoretical and policy debates about the legal profession, the legal service market, and the ramifications of expanding Chinese multinational companies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Qitong Yu ◽  
Shaoyang Fang ◽  
Jianjun Wang

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on executive compensation stickiness of listed companies by using the method of multiple regression. The results show that the pay stickiness is very common in the listed companies. The overall institutional investor’s shareholding is promoting the executive compensation stickiness. The empirical results show that the institutional investors are divided into the pressure resistance institutional investors and the pressure sensitive institutional investors, according to whether the institutional investors have the commercial relationship with the listed companies. The empirical results show that they are compared to the pressure. Sensitive institutions, pressure resistance institutional investors can significantly inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. However, different types of institutional investors have different preferences for the types of listed companies, and the enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance is different, and the pressure resistance institutional investors pay more attention to labor out of social responsibility. The long-term performance of a force intensive enterprise has a significant inhibitory effect on the stickiness of the executive compensation, while the pressure sensitive institutional investors actively manage and supervise the production and operation of the technology intensive enterprises for the consideration of the investment income, which has a restraining effect on the pay stickiness of the technology intensive enterprises.


Arts ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Lucia Mannini

The Modernist aesthetic, which spread all over Europe and in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, found the airbrush decorating technique to be the ideal instrument for expressing the requirements for an extreme synthesis of form. This was considered an essential element of the style, thanks to the areas of uniform color that shaded lighter tones inside basic, often geometric, shapes. The airbrush was used in that period mainly for graphics and for decorating ceramics, but it was also employed in other fields such as textile design. In Italy, the airbrush technique became popular in various artistic sectors including textiles, both for mass production and in the creation of single artistic pieces and in this latter field, Fides Testi was a leading figure.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-176
Author(s):  
Ewgeni Hersonski

The purpose of this paper is to present arguments concerning the fair levels of executive directors’ remuneration. It is argued that principles are a better way to achieve this goal. However, we also find arguments in support of detailed legal rules when dealing with this matter. Since both methods have their pros and cons the paper delivers a balanced discussion and also outlines how the executive pay is currently regulated in the UK, the United States as well as on the global scale.


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